<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rss version="2.0"
    xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
    xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
    xmlns:media="http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/">
<channel>
    <title>Robert Samuelson</title>
    <category>Robert Samuelson</category>
    <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/section/robert-samuelson/feed/</link>
    <atom:link href="https://www.durangoherald.com/section/robert-samuelson/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <description>Stay informed with the latest breaking news, local stories, sports, business, weather, and community events from Durango, Southwest Colorado, and the Four Corners region.</description>
    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 10 Jul 2026 18:52:07 -0600</lastBuildDate>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <ttl>30</ttl>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/robert-samuelson-the-time-has-come-to-impeach-and-remove-trump/</link>
        <title>Robert Samuelson: The time has come to impeach and remove Trump</title>
        <description>Imagine, if you will, the consequences if Trump had embraced this pivotal distinction. He need not have jettisoned many of his policy preferences. He could have still favored lower taxes, fewer regulations, tighter immigration controls, tougher trade policies against China...</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 28 Oct 2019 05:33:25 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">95AC7C90-91B2-54DB-E053-0100007FBC3F</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – No one has worked more aggressively to trigger impeachment than the president. You may remember that, during the campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump suggested that, should he win, he might become one of the most boring presidents in history. There was in this curious pledge at least the slim possibility that Trump would recognize the crucial difference between running for office and running the country. Imagine, if you will, the consequences if Trump had embraced this pivotal distinction. He need not have jettisoned many of his policy preferences. He could have still favored lower taxes, fewer regulations, tighter immigration controls, tougher trade policies against China and more pressure on our NATO allies to raise military spending. He might even have gently chided the Federal Reserve to loosen credit. Agree or disagree, these views are not wildly outside the political mainstream. What mattered was tone – the ability to debate issues without impugning the character of his opponents. To be sure, partisan debate is full of exaggerations and simplicities. Still, it usually respects some bounds of truth and civility. Following this traditional path, Trump might have boosted his popularity, especially given the strong economy inherited from Barack Obama. Even fierce critics might have conceded that, in practice, the boring Trump wasn’t so bad. But that is not the path Trump chose. In many ways, President Trump has been more gratuitously offensive than candidate Trump. He is a proven liar, saying what he thinks his audiences want to hear. Glenn Kessler and The Washington Post’s other Fact Checkers have counted more than 13,000 lies and deceptions. Worse, he appeals to his supporters’ basest human instincts. He regularly uses immigration to stir racial and ethnic tensions. He insults almost anyone who criticizes him. Trump fired Rex Tillerson, his first secretary of state, and later called him “dumb as a rock.” He’s had four national security advisers because he can’t hold advisers whom he ignores. Most of his policies are collapsing. He has made no progress in limiting North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. His withdrawal from the nuclear arms agreement with Tehran seems to have emboldened the Iranians to a more violent role in the Middle East. Watching this, many Israelis wonder if the United States would come to its aid if it were attacked by Iran or one of its proxies. His trade negotiations with China have fallen short, despite high tariffs imposed by both countries. Now Trump has descended to new levels of recklessness with his behavior involving Ukraine and Syria. After consistently denying election collusion with Russia, Trump virtually begged the president of Ukraine to collude by investigating former Vice President Joe Biden, a potential 2020 opponent. Trump’s abrupt withdrawal from Syria has shocked even many Republicans, who have deplored his decision as a strategic blunder and a moral outrage. We condemned to death many Kurds who had fought with Americans to defeat ISIS. We face a terrible choice. Republicans argue that the rush to impeachment aims to overturn the 2016 election. True. They say that this is bad for American democracy. Also true. One reason is legitimacy. What sustains successful democracies is the belief by winners and losers that they had a fair shot at winning. Faith in the system is more important than the result of one election. But if you start fiddling with the outcome, you destroy this belief and put democracy at risk. Because I respect this logic, I am an uneasy advocate for impeachment. If Americans don’t like their government, they can elect a new one. This is how mature and stable democracies are supposed to work. But there is at least one major exception: a situation where the president’s behavior itself is so erratic and disconnected from underlying realities that it poses an immediate threat to the country. This is mostly a matter of judgment, but I conclude that Trump has landed us in this unfortunate spot. What might he do next? The lesson of the Syrian debacle is that Trump is increasingly impervious to outside evidence and influence. No one knows what he will do, except that, reflecting his background as a reality-TV star, he aims to dominate the daily news cycle every day. This means he constantly needs new and more incendiary material. He incites his base because he’s good at it and enjoys it. Inevitably, this dragged him toward impeachment. Under the Constitution, the House first votes on the charges, which, if approved, would move to the Senate for trial, where a two-thirds majority would be required for conviction. It is widely assumed that few Republicans, if any, will support it, but events are moving so fast that this could change. I hope it does. Though scary, impeachment and removal are the lesser evils. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/fed-shouldnt-pick-a-fight-with-president-trump/</link>
        <title>Fed shouldn’t pick a fight with President Trump</title>
        <description>Dudley was head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and vice chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee from 2009 to 2018. He made his proposal in two columns for Bloomberg Opinion. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell had no knowledge...</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Sep 2019 05:33:07 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">91E50606-B5B4-5931-E053-0100007F067D</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – ”To the barricades.” That’s one way to characterize Bill Dudley’s idea that the Federal Reserve fight off President Trump’s attacks. It’s a bad idea, but it also shows the defects of Trump’s policies. Dudley was head of the New York Federal Reserve Bank and vice chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee from 2009 to 2018. He made his proposal in two columns for Bloomberg Opinion. Fed Chairman Jerome Powell had no knowledge of the first article before it appeared. In the first column, Dudley correctly argues that Trump’s policies are built on a contradiction. Trump wants the Fed to cut interest rates to spur economic growth and enhance his reelection prospects. Yet his aggressive tariffs have slowed economic growth. The mounting uncertainty raises prices and discourages firms from making new investments. Slowing economic growth then reduces the odds of Trump’s reelection. If the Fed surrenders to Trump’s bullying on interest rates, Dudley writes, it becomes complicit in his anti-trade policies, particularly involving China. The Fed may inadvertently encourage “the president to escalate the trade war further, increasing the risk of a recession.” To escape this, Dudley wants the Fed to denounce him. “Officials could state explicitly that the central bank won’t bail out an administration that keeps making bad choices on trade policy.” What Dudley proposes would change the Fed’s political role – shifting it from a nonpartisan and technocratic institution into a political entity with its own agenda. His proposal would demolish the Fed’s defense of its independence: that it’s necessary to achieve its congressional mandates of “price stability” and “maximum employment.” It would become an economic agency driven by partisan politics. You can imagine how long what’s left of the Fed’s independence would last. About 10 seconds. Dudley recognizes this but argues it’s inevitable. “I understand and support Fed officials’ desire to remain apolitical,” he writes. But Trump’s “ongoing attacks on Powell and on the institution have made that untenable.” He continues: “There’s even an argument that the election itself falls within the Fed’s purview. After all, Trump’s reelection arguably presents a threat to the U.S. and global economy, to the Fed’s independence and its ability to achieve its employment and inflation objectives. If the goal of monetary policy is to achieve the best long-term economic outcome, then Fed officials should consider how their decisions will affect the political outcome in 2020.” Given the controversy, Dudley published a second column denying what he clearly had advocated in the first. His proposal simply won’t fly politically – and shouldn’t. Elected officials surrender their explicit powers only when they’re convinced that the loss of these powers makes them politically stronger. The logic is self-evident: Politicians are better off when unpopular decisions are shifted to somebody else. This certainly describes the Fed’s “independence.” Politicians and economists alike recognize that there are times when the government must adopt unpopular policies for the country’s long-term welfare. In the Fed’s case, this usually involves higher interest rates to preempt financial speculation or undesirable inflation. Few elected officials praise higher interest rates. Indeed, they are happy to criticize the Fed publicly for decisions that, privately, they support. Dudley’s call to arms is wrong. The Fed’s independence is a messy arrangement full of potential inconsistencies, ambiguities and failures. It’s hard to describe as well as defend. Its main virtue seems to be that it’s better than any likely alternative. The Fed’s best survival strategy is to do what it’s been doing along, which is to use its best judgment to fulfill its congressional mandates. Picking a fight it cannot win against Trump is simply asking for trouble. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/on-economy-leadership-conspicuous-by-its-absence/</link>
        <title>On economy, leadership conspicuous by its absence</title>
        <description>There are parallels between the present tumultuous situation and past episodes of economic disruption, including the Great Depression of the 1930s. Just for the record: This is not a forecast of another Depression, when annual U.S. unemployment peaked at about...</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 21 Aug 2019 05:33:06 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">9080F636-6F99-1A5F-E053-0100007FF5B4</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – What is striking about the latest bouts of financial turmoil – the recent wild swings in global stock and bond markets – is that they provide a sobering reminder of the potential hazards of economic instability. There are parallels between the present tumultuous situation and past episodes of economic disruption, including the Great Depression of the 1930s. Just for the record: This is not a forecast of another Depression, when annual U.S. unemployment peaked at about 25% in 1933. For the moment, we are not anywhere near that level of distress. Still, if a deeper crisis ensues, President Donald Trump’s strident economic nationalism will be partially blamed, because he ignored the lessons of history. The name that comes to mind is Charles Kindleberger, an eminent economic historian of the post-World War II era who taught for years at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was a prolific author of books and articles. One of his masterpieces was “The World in Depression, 1929-1939.” The crux of Kindleberger’s thesis was that the underlying cause of the Depression was a vacuum of leadership. By this, he meant that Great Britain – which had provided that leadership in the 19th century – had been so weakened by World War I that it could no longer perform that function in the 1920s and early 1930s. Meanwhile, the United States – which would fill that role after World War II – was not ready to do so. In this context, the dominant country would keep its markets open to imports, so the trading system would not collapse under the weight of mounting protectionism. Another requirement was that the leading country (the “hegemon”) had to have the financial strength so that it could lend to banks and other needy borrowers during a crisis, so that the financial system, the repository of much wealth, would not self-destruct. In the recent foreword of the latest version of Kindleberger’s book, economists J. Bradford DeLong and Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley put it this way: “The root of Europe’s and the world’s problems was the absence of a benevolent hegemon: a dominant economic power able and willing to take the interests of smaller powers and the operation of the larger international system into account by stabilizing the flow of spending through the global (economy) ... by acting as a lender and consumer of last resort.” Kindleberger’s own explanation is similar: “The 1929 depression was so wide, so deep and so long because the international economic system was rendered unstable. ... When every country turned to protect its national private interest, the world’s public interest went down the drain, and with it the private interests of all.” Flash forward. Look around. Leadership is conspicuous by its absence. Nations pursue their self-identified private interests. The United States and China – the world’s two largest economies – are engaged in a bitter trade war that hurts both countries. The British are poised to leave the European Union (Brexit), with what consequences no one knows. At home, the Federal Reserve is under relentless assault by Trump, making its job doubly difficult, even granting that the best monetary policy is a legitimate subject of debate and disagreement. What about Germany, Europe’s traditional powerhouse? In the past year, its industrial production is down about 5%, says economist Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. If Germany does not change its “rigid policy view on the need to balance (its) budget under all circumstances, both Germany and Europe should brace themselves for a hard economic landing,” he argues. Economic leadership is a two-step process, each difficult. First, you must conceptualize the nature of the crisis; then you must devise and implement remedies that prevent it from worsening. In the 2007-09 financial crisis, that is what happened. The administrations of George W. Bush and Barack Obama recognized that the financial system might collapse, as panicked depositors and investors withdrew their funds. The remedy, organized on a global scale, was to pump money into the system until confidence returned. Trump officials don’t seem to think Kindleberger matters. Their pursuit of “greatness” may prove self-destructive. The good news is that the financial system is stronger now, meaning it has more capital to absorb losses, than in 2008. The bad news is that private debt levels in many countries, including the United States and China, are high. If too many borrowers default, losses may still cripple the financial system. There’s the old cliché that those who don’t remember history are condemned to repeat it. Let’s hope that’s not true this time. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/who-will-be-the-fall-guys-for-the-next-recession/</link>
        <title>Who will be the fall guys for the next recession?</title>
        <description>It also encompassed last week’s most important political news, notwithstanding all the public attention understandably focused on the mass shootings in El Paso and Dayton. There is growing evidence of a possible recession. If one materializes, President Trump could lose...</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 16 Aug 2019 05:33:17 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">90173043-EDB8-5A04-E053-0100007F16D1</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – To have a recession or not – that is the question. It also encompassed last week’s most important political news, notwithstanding all the public attention understandably focused on the mass shootings in El Paso and Dayton. There is growing evidence of a possible recession. If one materializes, President Trump could lose his most powerful argument for reelection: a strong economy. As is well known, Trump’s approval ratings have stubbornly remained well below 50%. Typically, they’ve hovered in the high 30s and the low 40s. Even this weak support depends heavily on a buoyant economy. Consider a Washington Post-ABC News poll taken in late June and early July. Trump’s overall approval rate was 44%, with 53% disapproving. But this poor showing already included public support for his economic stewardship, with 51% approving and 42% disapproving. On every other issue, the public disapproved of his performance. On immigration, the public disapproved by a 40%-to-57% margin. (In all these comparisons, Trump’s approval number comes first.) On taxes, the margin was 42% to 49%. On health care, it was 38% to 54%. Here are the remaining results: On women’s issues, he trailed 32% to 56%; on abortion, 32% to 54%; on gun violence, 36% to 52%; on foreign policy, 40% to 55%; on climate change, 29% to 62%. For Trump to lose his edge on the economy would clearly make it harder for him to win the general election. One obvious possibility would be perverse: Democrats might become so overconfident that they’d nominate someone too far to the left for most Americans. For most of Trump’s presidency, the economic news has been favorable. At its current 3.7%, the unemployment rate hasn’t been lower since the 1960s. In July, the present economic expansion became the longest in U.S. history at slightly more than 10 years, as determined by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The NBER usually declares a recession if the economy contracts for two consecutive quarters – that is, unemployment rises and output falls. What threatens this rosy picture is growing economic strife over trade. Last week was chaotic. Trump threatened to slap a 10% tariff on roughly $300 billion of Chinese exports to the United States. Rather than submit, China retaliated by letting its currency, the renminbi (RMB), depreciate below the symbolic rate of 7 to the dollar. A cheaper RMB would make China’s exports more competitive, offsetting some of the effect of Trump’s tariffs. Trump responded by declaring China a “currency manipulator” – an ominous-sounding label that merely requires the administration to open negotiations with China, something that it’s already doing and has led nowhere. Reflecting mounting uncertainty, the stock market fluctuated wildly during the week. All this is curbing already-sluggish economic growth. Higher tariffs raise prices to consumers and businesses, reducing their purchasing power. In late July – before the most recent turmoil – the International Monetary Fund downgraded its economic outlook and warned that “risks to the forecast are mainly to the downside.” The main danger seems a loss of confidence that delays business investment and consumer spending. The plunge in interest rates is seen as evidence that investors are seeking safe havens for their money. Most economists aren’t yet predicting a recession, but they’re drifting in that direction. Lewis Alexander of Nomura Securities International expects the economy’s growth to slow to less than 2% but not to enter recessionary territory. Joel Prakken of IHS Markit says its models put the odds of recession within a year at 1-in-3. Mark Zandi of Moody’s Analytics seems more pessimistic. “The U.S. and global economies are headed for a downturn unless President Trump backs away from his latest tariff threat,” he writes in a commentary. The combination of higher tariffs, higher prices and other factors have already cost almost 300,000 U.S. jobs, he estimates. Trump seems acutely aware of the threats to his reelection. He’s repeatedly assailed the Federal Reserve for not lowering short-term interest rates sooner; he’s also accepted a federal budget with huge deficits. These constitute traditional “stimulus” designed to keep the economy advancing. If they don’t work, it’s a safe bet that Trump won’t blame himself. The Fed and China are being set up as the fall guys for the next recession. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/on-china-and-trade-trumps-reputation-sinks/</link>
        <title>On China and trade, Trump’s reputation sinks</title>
        <description>What triggered the latest confrontation was Trump’s recent decision to slap a 10% tariff on roughly $300 billion of Chinese exports to the United States; earlier moves imposed a 25% tariff on $250 billion of Chinese exports. Trump’s actions reflected...</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 13 Aug 2019 05:33:06 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8FDCBD9D-199A-28AE-E053-0100007F6F6B</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – Donald Trump sold himself as an expert deal-maker. At the top of his list was a promised trade bargain with China. It isn’t working as planned. The trade war with China is a dangerous economic battle. What triggered the latest confrontation was Trump’s recent decision to slap a 10% tariff on roughly $300 billion of Chinese exports to the United States; earlier moves imposed a 25% tariff on $250 billion of Chinese exports. Trump’s actions reflected his frustration with China’s unwillingness to overhaul its trade policies. Instead, according to U.S. officials, China refused to buy more U.S. farm goods. American negotiators have also pushed China to stop forcing U.S. firms to relinquish their latest technologies as the cost of investing. China retaliated by having its central bank devalue the country’s currency, the renminbi (RMB). The bank had been defending the currency at 6.9 RMB to the dollar; it moved its target to 7 RMB. A cheaper currency would boost China’s exports, offsetting some of the effects of Trump’s tariffs. The administration reacted by declaring China a “currency manipulator.” Just what happens now is anyone’s guess. Start with China’s decision to let the RMB go to 7 to the dollar. Ordinarily, this would have been an economic hiccup. Now it’s been invested with enormous political significance. Economist Eswar Prasad of Cornell University, a China expert, puts it this way: “[The RMB depreciation] is a clear signal from the Chinese authorities that, from here on, all available covert and overt economic and trade actions are on the table as retaliation against U.S. trade hostilities.” Or take the U.S. decision to label China a “currency manipulator.” This sounds tough. It isn’t. Once the United States labels a country a “manipulator,” it must open negotiations with the offending nation. But we’ve already been negotiating unsuccessfully for years with China, notes economist C. Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute. More negotiations don’t look promising. In the past, China manipulated the RMB. The depreciation gave Chinese exporters an advantage and made imports into China more expensive. But now, say Bergsten and other economists, China has stopped using these practices and no longer meets the Treasury Department’s criteria for manipulation. The U.S. law defining currency manipulation sets three tests: First, a significant bilateral trade surplus with the United States. China meets this. But it no longer meets the second test, which is persistent intervention in foreign exchange markets, or the third test, which is a large current account surplus with the rest of the world. Despite this, Bergsten thinks Trump might use the stigma of being cast as a “currency manipulator” to take further action against China. In the past, he has mentioned imposing a 25% tariff on imported vehicles. Another possibility would be raising existing tariffs from 25% to much higher levels. The central question now is whether we are stumbling toward a larger crisis. There are several possibilities. One is that the gradual slowing of economic growth in Europe, China and the United States makes it harder for borrowers to service their loans. A related danger is massive capital flight from so-called “emerging market” countries (such China, India and Brazil), as investors move their funds into safe havens. This, too, would tighten credit. For the moment, most economists seem to be discounting a devastating crisis. Higher tariffs mean higher prices. They discourage spending and growth, but the amounts affected are modest compared to the size of the U.S. or Chinese economies. Remember that the U.S. economy is roughly $20 trillion. What could change the outlook is the impact of the U.S.-China conflict on consumer and business confidence. If people suddenly become more uncertain about the future, the impact on spending could be much larger. Meanwhile, Trump’s self-declared reputation as a great deal-maker is in shambles. It will be hard to make that claim again. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/we-already-have-a-welfare-state-so-whats-next/</link>
        <title>We already have a welfare state. So what’s next?</title>
        <description>The battle lines are clearly drawn. Democrats deplore rising inequality. They see a revitalized welfare state – with universal health coverage and more college subsidies – as making the system fairer. By contrast, President Trump favors more tax cuts, which,...</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Aug 2019 11:33:16 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8F12CFBA-8083-46BA-E053-0100007F49C0</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – It seems unavoidable. Like it or not, the U.S. welfare system is bound to play a big role in the 2020 election. The recent Democratic debate on health care is just a prelude to a broader discussion. The battle lines are clearly drawn. Democrats deplore rising inequality. They see a revitalized welfare state – with universal health coverage and more college subsidies – as making the system fairer. By contrast, President Trump favors more tax cuts, which, he argues, would accelerate economic growth and increase jobs. Who’s right? Is anyone? The unfolding campaign is an obvious opportunity to examine the state of economic inequality and the condition of the welfare state. Fortunately, the Congressional Budget Office has just issued a report that tackles both subjects. Let’s start with income inequality. There’s lots of it, and there’s little doubt that it’s gotten significantly worse over the past three or four decades. Just why is unclear. There is no consensus among economists. Explanations include rapid technological changes, the decline of well-paid manufacturing jobs, and globalization. On the other hand, the CBO analysis (and other studies as well) doesn’t justify the popular view that, except for the 1% and some others in the richest quintile, hardly anyone has gotten ahead. Here are some numbers from the CBO. From 1979 to 2016, the average income of the poorest fifth of Americans based on wages, salaries, dividends and Social Security benefits, grew only 33%, less than 1% annually. The middle three-fifths of Americans by income had similarly scanty gains. Meanwhile, the average incomes of the richest fifth of Americans – the upper-middle class and the wealthy – increased 99% over the same years. That’s a doubling. These figures seem to vindicate the stagnation theory. For millions of Americans, living standards have stopped growing. Or so it seems. The reality is more complicated. When the CBO adjusts these raw figures for taxes and “means-tested” programs – that is, benefits for the poor whose eligibility is determined by income limits – the picture changes. Instead of rising only 33% from 1979 to 2016, the income of the poorest fifth of Americans increases 85%, though it is still low in 2016 at $35,000. Americans dislike the concept of the welfare state. That’s for Europeans. We prefer the “safety net.” But we are deluding ourselves. Our safety net is their welfare state; the differences are those of detail, not fundamental principle. There are routinely massive transfers of income, mainly from the richest quintile to the poorest. About 40% of the income of the poorest fifth of Americans comes in these government transfers: Medicaid, Children’s Health Insurance Program, food stamps, housing subsidies and Supplemental Security Income. These programs have grown rapidly. From 1979 to 2016, the number of Medicaid and CHIP recipients quintupled to 101.8 million, up from 20 million. The wealthiest Americans pay most of the resulting taxes. In 2016, the richest quintile received 54% of the income and paid 69% of federal taxes. As for the top 1%, its income was 16% of the total, and they paid 25% of federal taxes. The conclusions from this morass of numbers are familiar, yet daunting. Despite significant anti-poverty spending, somewhere between a quarter and a third of Americans – roughly speaking – are struggling economically. It’s true that the poor are getting richer along with the rich, but they are doing so at a slower rate. So the gaps have grown over time and, what’s worse, there seem to be few fresh ideas as to how to reverse course. The proffered solutions have been tried for years without, it seems, notable success. The Democrats are practiced in spending more money on education and health care, while the Republicans are wedded to tax cuts. Surely these ongoing efforts have done some good, but not enough to make the bottom third of the economic distribution a much better place to be. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/heres-how-the-internets-tentacles-grabbed-me/</link>
        <title>Here’s how the internet’s tentacles grabbed me</title>
        <description>In this age of cybereverything, we all live in dread that we’re going to be attacked by the internet. Nearly everyone seems vulnerable. The internet is changing how we work, play, socialize, shop – and what we love and fear....</description>
        <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jul 2019 11:33:06 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8E5AE326-15F2-1D92-E053-0100007F8A76</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – I got hacked. It was scary. In this age of cybereverything, we all live in dread that we’re going to be attacked by the internet. Nearly everyone seems vulnerable. The internet is changing how we work, play, socialize, shop – and what we love and fear. Your data is for sale. If there is a saving grace, it is this: We assume that “bad stuff” always happens to somebody else. Well, not always. My encounter with bad stuff began a few weeks ago when I received a letter from the Social Security Administration, via “snail mail.” By itself, this was neither alarming nor threatening. If you’re 65 or over (I am 73), you receive regular notices from Social Security and its first cousin, Medicare. The letter looked authentic – and was. “Thank you for using Social Security’s online services,” it said. “On June 28, 2019, you successfully created an online account with the Social Security Administration.” This, too, seemed innocuous, except for one troubling detail: I DIDN’T CREATE AN ONLINE ACCOUNT WITH THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION. True, I already receive my monthly Social Security benefit through electronic deposit into my bank. But that had been going on for years. It was the only contact I desired with the Social Security Administration. Perhaps SSA was quietly expanding its bureaucratic reach. Or not. I decided to call the 800 number in the letter. (The 800 number seemed legitimate, because the same number appeared on many SSA sites.) The wait was about an hour. I was tempted to hang up. I’m glad I didn’t. The woman who answered was courteous and helpful. Yes, my personal data had been altered, so that my monthly benefit would be diverted to someone else’s bank account, not mine. She reinstated the correct address and put a “block” on the account, meaning that unless I visited an SSA office, my personal information could not be changed. “You will continue to receive your monthly payments,” the SSA promised. That’s reassuring, if true. (Note: Anyone familiar with my policy views knows that I favor benefit cuts for the affluent elderly. Accepting benefits now may seem hypocritical. Not so. I would gladly cut mine as part of an overall program.) Just how my personal data was altered remains a mystery to me and, perhaps, to the SSA. “It’s hard to know how identity thieves obtain personal information used to commit this type of fraud,” said SSA Inspector General Gail Ennis in an email. We do know some things, however. The existing approach to creating reliable identification numbers (say, Social Security cards or driver’s licenses) is known as “knowledge-based verification.” To prove you are who you say you are, you’re asked questions to which, presumably, only you know the answers: for example, your birth date, home address or Social Security number. But the KBV “model has fallen apart online,” asserts The Better Identity Coalition, a group searching for more accurate approaches. KBV is hobbled because data breaches have made a lot of “secret” information widely available to cybercriminals on the internet. The number of reported data breaches – hostile penetrations of computer networks – has soared from 421 in 2011 to 1,579 in 2017, according to the Identity Theft Resource Center. Each breach in turn may contain data on millions of people. The breach in 2017 of Equifax, a major credit bureau, is widely regarded as a bonanza for cyber-thieves, because it contained personal data on more than 147 million people. I surmised that the SSA must be swamped with complaints like mine: benefits that were digitally hijacked. Wrong. Their number peaked at about 12,000 in 2013. For the first half of 2018, that number was down to about 200, estimates the OIG’s office. Compared with the roughly 63 million Social Security recipients, that’s virtually nothing. One explanation is that some transfers are done more securely through electronic networks than by checks, which can be stolen in the mail or lost. In 2013, the Treasury required that virtually all benefits be paid electronically. Another safeguard, which was important in my case, was the requirement that recipients receive by mail any notice of a change in address. If the change is legitimate, it’s routine. But if the address change is bogus, as it was for me, then the beneficiary can contact the SSA before any serious fraud takes place. So, be forewarned. This is the internet’s new normal. It expands our choices but compromises our freedom. It encloses society in a permanent cocoon of suspicion. There’s no escaping its grasping tentacles. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/is-vladimir-putin-right-that-liberalism-is-obsolete/</link>
        <title>Is Vladimir Putin right that liberalism is obsolete?</title>
        <description>He yearns, it seems, to be seen as a leading political thinker, respected for his analysis as well as feared for his actions. This is a reasonable reading of Putin’s recent interview with the Financial Times, which included his remarkable...</description>
        <pubDate>Sat, 13 Jul 2019 11:33:06 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8D6A1456-7FB1-42DB-E053-0100007FA67F</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – It looks as if Vladimir Putin wants to be recalled as something besides an aggressive autocrat. He yearns, it seems, to be seen as a leading political thinker, respected for his analysis as well as feared for his actions. This is a reasonable reading of Putin’s recent interview with the Financial Times, which included his remarkable declaration that “the liberal idea has become obsolete.” What to make of this? For starters, let’s give Putin his due. You may dislike or detest him but you have to acknowledge that he’s a keen observer of the times. The post-World War II liberalism that he disparages is clearly under siege. Economically, it’s strapped for cash. There are at least three reasons for this. First, economic growth in the West has slowed. The promise of postwar liberalism was that strong and steady growth would buy social peace. It would enable governments to ensure full employment, protect vulnerable groups (the poor, elderly and the sick) and engage in worthy causes (for example, combating climate change). The slowdown of economic growth limits governments’ ability to meet these pledges. From 1950 to 2018, U.S. growth has averaged 3.2%, but in the next decade, it’s widely projected to be around 2%. The slowdown reflects baby boomers’ retirement and weak productivity growth. Other countries have experienced similar slumps. Second, most advanced societies are aging, which means they’re committed to paying more in benefits for the elderly. Though the aging occurs slowly, it’s dramatic. In 2015, 14.9% of the U.S. population was 65 or over; by 2050, that’s projected by the Census Bureau to be 22.1%. For Germany, the comparable figures are 21.5% for 2015 and 30.1% for 2050; for China, the aging is especially rapid – from 10.1% in 2015 to 26.8% in 2050. Finally, there are those budget deficits. It’s true that, until now, the United States and many other advanced countries have been able to borrow huge quantities of money at low interest rates. Perhaps that will continue indefinitely. Or perhaps it won’t. Even on today’s trajectory, U.S. federal debt would exceed 90% of gross domestic product (GDP) by 2029. As a practical matter, countries need a crude consensus as to who’s in charge and what they’re empowered to do. Dictatorial societies do this by fear and force. By contrast, most modern democracies have resorted to some form of “liberalism,” broadly defined. We’ve long governed by hope: a better life. In its loftiest state, postwar liberalism was expected to have a cleansing effect on countries’ social climate, liberating people from prejudice and small-mindedness. The liberal appeal spanned the ideological spectrum. In the United States and Europe, centrist governments of the left and right ruled. It is this promise of a morally elevated electorate that Putin panned. The trouble, professor Putin lectured, is that many people have lost faith in the liberal idea. They have moved on. Now, Putin and his fellow travelers, including President Trump and others, propose that we govern by fear: a dread of outsiders. No one should suppose that Putin’s nationalistic substitute for lapsed liberalism will make the world a kinder, gentler or more stable place. The liberal ideal presumed, perhaps naively, that people could be brought together by common interests and common values. The nationalistic alternative takes as its starting point the view that there will be winners and losers. People feel threatened. Liberal high-mindedness has created a backlash by justifying policies and practices that are unpopular with large swaths of the population -- open borders, unwanted immigration, globalization and multiculturalism. Liberal policies “come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population,” Putin said. People value their national identities. They generally fear policies and practices that would erode these identities. One question in a 2016 Pew study asked whether increases in the number of ethnic groups, races and nationalities made their countries “a worse place to live.” Large shares of Greeks (63%), Italians (53%) and Germans (31%) said “yes.” We are straddled between two systems. The daunting task is to salvage the best of postwar liberalism while, at the same time, acknowledging the importance of national identities and sovereignty. It may be a mission impossible. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/dem-candidates-more-like-students-than-leaders/</link>
        <title>Dem candidates more like students than leaders</title>
        <description>All seemed articulate and intelligent. All had a good grasp of the classroom material – in this case, the programs they were advocating or opposing. All were palpably ambitious, eager to show that they were better suited than their rivals,...</description>
        <pubDate>Sat, 06 Jul 2019 05:33:14 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8CCA124C-00D2-5AFA-E053-0100007F06B1</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – What struck me about the first debates among 20 candidates for the Democratic nomination for president was how they resembled graduate students. All seemed articulate and intelligent. All had a good grasp of the classroom material – in this case, the programs they were advocating or opposing. All were palpably ambitious, eager to show that they were better suited than their rivals, without seeming too egotistical or ruthless. None, however, seemed “presidential.” At this stage, perhaps it’s inevitable. Time will pass, and the candidates’ strengths or weaknesses will become more apparent. Electoral politics are often likened to sports. If so, we are still in the first inning, and the starting pitcher is still facing the first batter. And yet, I am already left with the uneasy feeling that this campaign may leave us especially ill-informed. Three issues bother me. The first is this: The campaign’s attention is focused heavily – almost exclusively – on domestic problems and programs, but the most pressing issues that await the next president will probably involve foreign policy. How are we to judge the rival candidates on matters with which they have little experience? Assuming President Trump does not win reelection, how is his successor going to deal with China, Russia, Iran, North Korea and our estranged allies as well as our trade and economic relations with them? With the conspicuous exception of former Vice President Joe Biden, none of the candidates has much international experience. To be fair, this is often the case, but the consequences today loom larger, precisely because the post-World War II framework has broken down. Its replacement needs to deal with the reality of a populist backlash – both in the United States and other advanced societies – as well as the need to remain engaged globally. In a world shrunken by technology and trade, we do not have the luxury of neo-isolationism and neo-protectionism, even if Trump thinks we do. Second: A similar dilemma afflicts domestic policies. As a society, we have committed ourselves to more programs and subsidies than we can easily afford. Despite this, the candidates seem wedded to yet more expensive experiments in social policy. Shortly before last week’s debates, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) released the latest version of its annual long-term budget outlook. Even with the economy near “full employment,” the federal government runs massive annual budget deficits, meaning that we spend more than we tax. At the moment, those deficits equal about 4% of the economy (gross domestic product) or about $1 trillion annually. Under present tax and spending policies, deficits will grow for decades. The resulting debt – the accumulation of past annual deficits – is now about 78% of GDP, up from 35% of GDP in 2007. By 2029, it’s projected to be 92% of GDP. In its report, the CBO notes that the debt “has exceeded 70% of GDP during only one other period in U.S. history – from 1944 to 1950,” reflecting the impact of World War II. A prudent society would defend itself against a conceivable financial crisis by reducing budget deficits. It wouldn’t expand them. Yet, that is what the Democratic candidates propose. Universal health care? Not a problem. Free college? Yes, indeed. Equal pay for women? Long overdue. A Marshall Plan for Central America? A sensible idea. “Green” jobs – wind and solar power? Absolutely necessary. A write-off of student college debt? An excellent suggestion. The list goes on. The Democrats’ agendas assume that low interest rates and taxes on the wealthy can pay for new benefits. But even if this upbeat assertion turns out to be true, it still leaves massive deficits under present programs. What lies ahead on this path is disillusion, as spending commitments don’t match campaign promises. (Inevitably, the same daunting arithmetic faces Trump, now and in the future.) Third: leadership. The power of the presidency, the late political scientist Richard Neustadt constantly argued, is the capacity to persuade – that is, to convince other people that what the president wants is what they ought to want for their own good and the nation’s good. Neustadt’s imperative applies to both individual power brokers and to mass constituencies of voters. Among these candidates, do we have anyone who can exert that sort of leadership, especially when much of the persuasion that needs doing involves the delivery of unwelcome news? Who knows? It’s still the first inning, and maybe a slugger is coming to bat. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/trumps-mexico-tariffs-would-be-risky-and-nasty/</link>
        <title>Trump’s Mexico tariffs would be risky and nasty</title>
        <description>For anyone who missed Trump’s announcement, here’s a summary. The president said he would impose a 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico ($372 billion in 2018) unless it halted illegal immigration by June 10. It would add another 5%...</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 10 Jun 2019 05:33:28 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8ABFE3AA-35F4-27CF-E053-0100007F7449</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – President Trump’s latest foray into trade policy is notable for its economic recklessness (it could tip Mexico into a recession, followed perhaps by the United States), its gratuitous insults of a close ally (Mexico) and its rank opportunism (it would shift power to the White House from Congress). For anyone who missed Trump’s announcement, here’s a summary. The president said he would impose a 5% tariff on all imports from Mexico ($372 billion in 2018) unless it halted illegal immigration by June 10. It would add another 5% every month that the demand was not met until the tariff hit 25%. The timing of Trump’s policy is especially offensive. Earlier, Mexico, Canada and the United States had negotiated a successor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA); the new arrangement is called the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Mexico and Canada were preparing to ratify their agreements; the Trump administration was trying to assemble the necessary support. The betrayal resembles a marriage where one of the betrothed doesn’t show up for the wedding. “Unless the Congress intervenes or Trump changes his mind, the new USMCA is dead,” said Edward Alden, a trade expert at the Council on Foreign Relations, in a blog post. The implications extend beyond Trump’s proposal, Alden argued. The White House has cited the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977 as authorizing Trump’s ultimatum, but Alden says that law aimed to cover “unusual and extraordinary threats” as opposed to giving the president “carte blanche authority to impose tariffs on close allies.” Moreover, Alden added, “no other country – no matter how closely allied or how dependent on the United States – will be willing to negotiate any agreements with this administration, knowing they can be torn up at the whim of the president.” There is a sheer nastiness to Trump’s proposal that seems to ignore the fact that, counting services (tourism, transportation) and trade with Canada, the U.S. trade deficit with the NAFTA countries was only about 5% ($66 billion) on total trade of $1.385 trillion in 2018, according to government figures from the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. If Trump’s tariffs do go into effect, the impact on Mexico’s economy could be devastating, according to Shannon K. O’Neil, also of the Council on Foreign Relations. The economy has already slowed, she said, and is highly dependent on trade, which equals 38% of the economy. In another indication of how vulnerable economic growth may be in the NAFTA countries, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome H. Powell suggested that the Fed might ease monetary policy to offset any adverse effect from Trump’s tariffs. The stock market rallied strongly on the news. But whether Powell’s pledge is sensible economic policy is an open question. Implying that the Fed can – and should – ease monetary policy to offset the possible hazards of Trump’s trade policies puts the Fed in an uncomfortable position. If the Fed does nothing, it increases the odds of a recession. If the Fed takes action, it seems to support Trump’s trade views. There are drawbacks no matter what it does or doesn’t do. Meanwhile, Republican senators have been meeting to discuss a challenge to Trump’s tariffs. The situation is nothing if not fluid. But whatever happens, Alden is surely correct on the main issue: “If the Congress lets Trump get away with this, he will be free to slap tariffs on any country or any product at any time for whatever reason he dreams up. Congress’ constitutional authority over trade will be utterly hollow.” Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/the-brave-and-scary-new-world-of-trading-blocs/</link>
        <title>The brave and scary new world of trading blocs</title>
        <description>Since World War II, the international trading system has operated on the premise of “most favored nation (MFN),” meaning concessions granted to one country must be extended to all others in the system. The standoff between the U.S. and China...</description>
        <pubDate>Thu, 06 Jun 2019 05:30:00 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">8A95F2A5-877C-2D97-E053-0100007FE162</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – We may be on the cusp of an upheaval in global trade. Since World War II, the international trading system has operated on the premise of “most favored nation (MFN),” meaning concessions granted to one country must be extended to all others in the system. The standoff between the U.S. and China suggests that this is giving way to the emergence of rival economic blocs that increasingly control international trade and investment. In a new paper, economists David Jacks and Dennis Novy argue that today’s contentious trade disputes recall what happened during the Great Depression. Led by Great Britain and Germany, competing trading blocs governed large portions of global commerce. Something similar is happening now. Witness President Trump’s threat to impose a 5% tariff on Mexican imports as a way of reducing illegal immigration.“The trade wars of the present day [may lead] … to a reorientation of world trade around China – and U.S.-centric trade blocs,” they write. To be sure, MFN was not always followed with religious fervor. Exceptions occurred. Practical politics often collided with economic principle. Still, the U.S. was the world’s major economic power and the main architect of the postwar trading system, and it supported MFN. The traditional American view has been that trade liberalization (fewer tariffs and quotas) benefits all countries, importers and exporters alike. Trade is not a zero-sum game, where one party’s gain is inevitably the other’s loss. Now this crude consensus seems to be crumbling under China’s emergence as an economic superpower and Trump’s election as president. The U.S. and China each believes it could do better in a system that gives more weight to its economic power. Instead of a multilateral trading system, where gains are negotiated and shared by all, the U.S. and China each prefers a system built on a series of bilateral or country-to-country negotiations. The Trump administration has argued that it could do better under this sort of system because providing access to the massive U.S. marketplace would enhance its negotiating leverage. The point is simple: If you don’t give us what we want, you can’t play in our market. China nominally supports a multilateral trading system, regulated by the World Trade Organization while it does what it pleases – subsidizes critical industries, discriminates against foreign firms and forces disclosure of technical secrets as the price for staying in China. Like Americans, the Chinese believe they have superior bargaining power, based on the draw of their huge market. Until World War I, free trade flourished in Europe. From 1815 to 1913, “world exports increased roughly by a factor of 50 in real terms,” note Jacks and Novy. But the Depression changed the context. Wages and prices fell sharply; unemployment rose dramatically. Desperate for relief, governments resorted to tariffs as a way to reduce imports and halt the downward spiral. In 1932, Great Britain ditched its historic defense of free trade and negotiated bilateral agreements with Australia, Canada, India, Newfoundland, New Zealand, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia: Commonwealth countries. Later in the decade, Germany formed a the Reichsmark bloc, whose members included Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Romania. The U.S. part in this surging protectionism was the well-known Smoot-Hawley tariff legislation signed by President Hoover in 1930. “At the moment, we have not witnessed a wholesale collapse of the modern trading system,” say Jacks and Novy, but we seem to be headed that way. It’s not an ideal destination, notes economist Douglas Irwin of Dartmouth College. Trading blocs suffer from two significant drawbacks, he says. First, they sacrifice some economic benefits; decisions of where to buy and sell are determined by political considerations, not economic efficiency. This is a serious, but manageable, flaw. The larger defect is that trade blocs become a source of international conflict. Rather than trading for mutual benefit, countries increasingly view trade as a way to punish their adversaries and reward their friends. That seems to be Trump’s belief, reflected in his threat to impose a 5% tariff on Mexican imports. We should be questioning whether this is where we want to go, and if not, how do we stop the drift? Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/many-economists-often-dont-know-whats-going-on/</link>
        <title>Many economists often don’t know what’s going on</title>
        <description>We see this all the time. Just recently, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the economy had created 263,000 payroll jobs in April. This was almost 40% more than the 190,000 that economists had previously predicted. Something new and...</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 15 May 2019 05:33:14 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">88B6257B-5E12-0445-E053-0100007F3943</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – The most intriguing thing we have learned about economists in recent decades is that they don’t know nearly as much as they thought they knew. We see this all the time. Just recently, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the economy had created 263,000 payroll jobs in April. This was almost 40% more than the 190,000 that economists had previously predicted. Something new and different seems to be happening in labor markets, as the growth in jobs has continued to be unexpectedly strong. But just what it is, how long it will last and whether it might soon be reversed are mysteries to most of us, including most economists. It’s part of the larger problem. As an economic journalist for roughly half a century, I have slowly and somewhat reluctantly come to the conclusion that many economists often don’t know what they’re talking about. Most economists I’ve dealt with over the years are extremely smart and well-informed. Most are also public-spirited and generous with their time. With a few exceptions, they elevate the level of public discussion. Still, time after time, economists have failed to foresee major economic trends. In recent years, global interest rates have plunged to historically low levels. Given the importance of interest rates in economic decisions, this is a big deal. But most economists did not anticipate the declines and can’t fully explain them. Going back a bit further, economists did not predict double-digit inflation, which frightened and demoralized Americans. Indeed, policies advocated by Democratic economists in the 1960s kindled the inflation. Now, inflation has unexpectedly remained low, and many economists have been baffled by that. Productivity is another disappointment. It means doing more with less. Higher productivity is the ultimate engine of higher living standards. It is crucial to economic success. Over the past five decades, I cannot remember one instance when economists have correctly forecast a major shift in productivity growth, whether up or down. Not in the late 1960s and early 1970s when productivity growth slowed. Nor in the 1990s when productivity accelerated. And not now, when there’s been a pronounced slowdown. The Trump administration’s economists believe they will reverse these trends. Their corporate tax cuts will stimulate investment and productivity gains, the thinking goes. Maybe, but I’m skeptical. My view is that the ignorance gap is huge between what economists know and what we need to know. The most conspicuous example is the recent 2008-09 financial crisis. “Why did nobody notice it?” Queen Elizabeth famously asked. The answer is fairly easy. Economists and others are conditioned by their own experiences, and a widespread financial panic in a rich society was not among those experiences. We had solved that problem through sensible government regulation and sophisticated financial management. So it seemed. In reality, the belief that we had outlawed a financial panic rationalized more risk-taking behavior, which ultimately led to a financial panic. The larger cause of the ignorance gap is the very complexity and obscurity of a $20 trillion economy (the United States) or an $85 trillion economy (the world). To say that it is changing in detailed and often-unanticipated ways is simply to affirm that mere mortals, including economists, have never been very good at predicting the future. What I think can be held against economists – not all, but many – is that they exaggerate what they know and how much they can influence the economy. The aim is usually to gain and retain political relevance and power. But the actual result is often disappointment, as government performance falls short of promises. A little more humility might be in order. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/candidates-ignore-cost-of-an-aging-population/</link>
        <title>Candidates ignore cost of an aging population</title>
        <description>The two programs alone constituted 45 percent of the non-interest federal budget in 2018, a share that the trustees say is being driven up by the continuing retirement of baby boomers and the high cost of health care. The trustees...</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 01 May 2019 05:33:15 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">87ADA5DE-8FE9-637A-E053-0100007F9B9F</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – Just for the record, we ought to note that trustees for Social Security and Medicare recently released their annual reports. The two programs alone constituted 45 percent of the non-interest federal budget in 2018, a share that the trustees say is being driven up by the continuing retirement of baby boomers and the high cost of health care. The trustees issued their usual dire warnings that, absent congressional action, the trust funds that finance these programs will run out of cash: Medicare in 2026 and Social Security in 2035. The trustees suggest benefits might have to be cut so that Social Security’s spending is covered by its revenues, which come mainly from payroll taxes. The prospective cuts to Social Security benefits would initially be around 20% and grow to 25%. Though this is possible, it seems unlikely. Based on past experience, presidents and congresses will simply divert more non-payroll tax revenues to Social Security and Medicare. This will trigger chain reactions, because the money has to come from somewhere, and the choices are no secret: higher taxes; higher borrowing – and bigger budget deficits; or cuts in programs from the FBI to the National Park Service. The message here is familiar. The aging of the population, including the high cost of health care, is determining the nation’s budget priorities. By and large, both parties are practicing the politics of evasion. That is, they have taken Social Security and Medicare spending as a given and have ignored its impact on the rest of the budget. This is true of both Republicans and Democrats. President Trump successfully proposed his $1.5 trillion tax cut (over 10 years), while many of the already-announced Democratic candidates for president have proposed major new programs. Consider. Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders plugs his proposal for “Medicare for all.” Massachusetts Sen. Elizabeth Warren wants to make tuition at public colleges free. California Sen. Kamala Harris touts a roughly $3 trillion tax cut (over a decade), which she describes as “the most significant middle-class tax cut in generations.” On paper, each of these proposals is financed by some sort of tax increase. But what isn’t acknowledged or emphasized is that the proposals typically ignore the existing budget deficits, which are now approaching $1 trillion annually. What is to be done about these deficits? The answer, according to most of the candidates, is that nothing is to be done. The large deficits don’t yet seem to have hurt the economy, so cautious candidates conclude they should be left alone. It’s more rewarding politically to peddle grandiose and costly proposals and pretend that the large deficits won’t cause any long-term problems. By and large, this is the path of least resistance. Ideally, we should be debating the implications of an aging society. At last count, the average life expectancy of someone who reaches 65 is roughly 20 years. In 1950, life expectancy for someone aged 65 was only around 15 years. Most government programs were built on the assumption that the elderly were physically and mentally compromised, and although this was (and is) true, the declines begin later. We could be working longer – and should be. Eligibility ages for Social Security and Medicare should be raised, perhaps as high as 70 and gradually introduced over a 20-year period, to reflect the improved health and the nation’s stretched finances. This prospective transformation is one of the great issues facing the country, but our leaders are evading it because it is not a vote-getter. They should be ashamed. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/what-caused-the-financial-crisis-our-success/</link>
        <title>What caused the financial crisis? Our success</title>
        <description>Theories abound. Liberals blame Wall Street greed and lax government oversight. The conservatives’ villain is the government’s aggressive promotion of homeownership, which flooded the economy with bad mortgages. Although these ideological explanations have some merit, the real story is more...</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 19 Apr 2019 05:33:06 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">86BD12A9-1A56-099D-E053-0100007F2527</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – It is astonishing that even though the global financial crisis occurred a decade ago, we do not yet have a clear and convincing explanation of its basic cause. Theories abound. Liberals blame Wall Street greed and lax government oversight. The conservatives’ villain is the government’s aggressive promotion of homeownership, which flooded the economy with bad mortgages. Although these ideological explanations have some merit, the real story is more complicated and perverse. What ultimately caused the financial crisis was the economy’s success. We had, it seemed, entered a new era of less risk. Believing this, Americans embraced more-risky behaviors which, once shunned, suddenly seemed justified by widespread optimism. The faith that economic risk had declined inspired more risk-taking because it seemed safe. What prompts these thoughts is a new book, “Firefighting: The Financial Crisis and its Lessons,” by Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner and Henry Paulson. You’ll recall that these three were major players in halting the crisis. Bernanke was head of the Federal Reserve, Paulson was George W. Bush’s treasury secretary and Geithner was Barack Obama’s treasury secretary. The 129-page text provides a chronology. The authors no doubt hope their narrative buttresses their reputations. Most of their analysis rings true, with one glaring exception: their theory of what created the crisis. Here’s one passage: “The story of how the crisis happened is ... about risky leverage, runnable funding, shadow banking, rampant securitization, and outdated regulation.” A rough translation: Lenders lent too much; borrowers borrowed too much; and arcane financial instruments stymied regulators from stopping the process. This is the conventional wisdom. It’s also wrong because it mistakes the crisis’s consequences for its cause. The cause lay in the delusional beliefs that the economy had changed so much that practices that in the past would have been considered risky were no longer so. Economists argued that the business cycle had smoothed. They called this the Great Moderation. Recessions would be shorter and less severe than in the past. This seemed to be confirmed by the decade-long expansion in the 1990s, the longest in U.S. history. Another positive sign was the decline of double-digit inflation from 13% in 1980 to about 4% in 1982. This calmed nerves and triggered huge increases in stocks, bonds and home values. In the 1980s, household net worth roughly doubled to $21.6 trillion, according to Fed data. In the 1990s, it doubled again to $42.8 trillion. All this wealth fueled a consumption boom. Americans saved less of their paychecks and borrowed more against inflated home values and investment portfolios. From 1980 to 2000, consumption spending rose from 61% of the economy’s output to 66%. In today’s dollars, that’s $1 trillion in consumer spending. Global trade was strong. America was in the midst of a vast technological upheaval around internet technologies. Why not be optimistic about the future? Lenders lent too much and borrowers borrowed too much, but the excesses were the new normal and could be rationalized in an economy that stayed close to full employment. Ever-rising housing prices would protect lenders; defaults would be covered by selling the homes. “If every subprime mortgage holder defaulted, the losses would be modest and easily absorbed,” says the Bernanke-Geithner-Paulson book. The whole financial system was caught up in a frenzy. Vast sums were to be made in many markets. Banks, borrowers, economists and regulators were all deceived by the same destructive optimism. If greed (the liberals’ villain) or regulatory mischief (the conservatives’) were the chief cause of the crisis, then reform should be fairly easy. In their book, Bernanke, Geithner and Paulson make some sensible suggestions to reduce the odds of a future financial crisis and to handle it if one does occur. Many, if not most, of these proposals should be adopted. But we should be realistic. The lesson of the financial crisis is that it wasn’t just the product of overzealous regulators or greedy capitalists. They played a role, but the larger role was played by the convergence of many forces that we understand only in retrospect and can control only with difficulty. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/federal-control-of-education-has-failed-next/</link>
        <title>Federal control of education has failed … Next?</title>
        <description>Faith in education is one of the nation’s bedrock values. Better schools would (we think) narrow economic inequalities and help people reach their personal potential. Promises to revitalize schools are inevitable. There’s a magical quality to them. Be skeptical. Already,...</description>
        <pubDate>Sun, 14 Apr 2019 05:33:07 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">862F579E-56E3-5756-E053-0100007F862E</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – You can count on one familiar refrain in the 2020 presidential campaign: Fix the schools. Faith in education is one of the nation’s bedrock values. Better schools would (we think) narrow economic inequalities and help people reach their personal potential. Promises to revitalize schools are inevitable. There’s a magical quality to them. Be skeptical. Already, at least two Democratic presidential candidates are pitching major educational proposals. Sen. Kamala Harris would give most teachers a huge pay raise, reportedly averaging about $13,500. Teachers, it’s argued, are underpaid. This makes good ones hard to recruit and retain. Meanwhile, ex-San Antonio Mayor Julian Castro advocates universal pre-K classes to prepare children for school. Both ideas sound sensible. But aside from the sizable costs, history suggests that creating gains in achievement and academic skills for the poor is extraordinarily difficult. That’s the finding of a major new study. It reviewed test scores for Americans born between 1954 and 2001 to see how much the achievement gap had closed between students with low and high socioeconomic status. The startling result: hardly at all. The explanation is not that public policy wasn’t trying. The discouraging conclusion occurred despite the federal government’s decision to provide extra funding for poor schools under Title 1 of the Education and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Previously, public schools were funded mainly by localities and states. Corrected for inflation, overall spending per student nearly quadrupled from 1960 to 2015. Still, there was little effect on the achievement gap. The study was conducted by Eric Hanushek and Laura Talpey of Stanford University, Paul Peterson of Harvard University and Ludger Woessmann of the University of Munich. Tests were given at two ages – 14 and 17. The central problem seems to occur in high schools. Tests administered at age 14 actually showed improving student performance. But most of the gains reversed by age 17, just when students were preparing for college or work. During this half-century, there was no general rise in achievement. The population’s changing ethnic and racial composition doesn’t explain the stubborn achievement gap. (In 1980, the population of children ages 5-17 was 74.6% white, 14.5% black, 8.5% Hispanic and 2.5% “other.” By 2011, the corresponding figures were 54.2% white, 14% black, 22.8% Hispanic and 8.9% other.) Separately, the study found similar trends among whites, suggesting that race or ethnicity aren’t major causes. The study did not find that the achievement gap has actually gotten worse over the past half-century. If this conclusion holds up, it would qualify as the study’s main bit of good news. Repeatedly, the study’s authors express frustration that they can’t explain what happens in high school to undo previous gains in achievement. “The high school is a broken institution,” Peterson said in an interview. “We need to create more learning opportunities for kids in high school.” Broadly speaking, the study vindicates the results of earlier research conducted by sociologist James Coleman (usually called the “Coleman report”) in 1966. As part of Lyndon Johnson’s “war on poverty,” Coleman examined what factors promoted educational success. He found parental education, income and race to be strongly connected to student achievement, while per-pupil expenditures and class size were much less so. Schools are being asked to do for their students what families usually do. This is a tall order that is probably beyond the capability of most schools. We should keep trying. But we should not ignore history. The national strategy of controlling the country’s schools through subsidies and regulatory requirements has prevailed for half a century. It’s failed. The federal government should exit the business of overseeing K-12 education. Federal aid would halt, and the financial loss would be offset by having the national government assume all the states’ Medicaid costs. We should let states and localities see whether they can make schools work better. We need solutions, not slogans. Robert J. Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/democrats-media-to-blame-for-ignoring-dreamers/</link>
        <title>Democrats, media to blame for ignoring Dreamers</title>
        <description>As you will recall, the Dreamers are illegal immigrants who were brought to the United States as young children. Most have grown up as Americans; sending them back to a country where they barely lived seems a particularly heartless punishment...</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 26 Feb 2019 10:19:25 -0700</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">82CEAB09-E401-614E-E053-0100007F2E7F</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – The “Dreamers” lost again. As you will recall, the Dreamers are illegal immigrants who were brought to the United States as young children. Most have grown up as Americans; sending them back to a country where they barely lived seems a particularly heartless punishment – and self-defeating for the United States if they’re responsible and productive adults. Happily, this is one problem for which there’s an obvious political solution. The broad outlines of a compromise are no secret: The Dreamers get legal protection to stay in the United States; in exchange, President Trump and his allies get a significant down payment on his “wall” along the southern border. Details can be negotiated. Who exactly qualifies as a “Dreamer”? Estimates vary from 800,000 to 1.8 million. Do they get a path to citizenship, a green card allowing permanent residency, or something in between? How much money does Trump receive for his wall? Are other restrictions imposed? Each side gets something; each side accepts something it dislikes. After all, that’s what compromise is about. The fact that this eludes Congress and the White House is a triumph of partisanship over policy. No one wants to be seen surrendering to the other side, even if compromise makes – on balance – everyone better off. The latest example of this corrosive calculus is the recent legislation preventing another government shutdown. It presented an ideal opportunity to forge an agreement. No dice. Conventional wisdom mainly blames the Trump White House. Democrats argued that Trump couldn’t be trusted to uphold his part of a bargain. There is some truth here; Trump has constantly vacillated on his views of the Dreamers. But this is only a partial truth. Democrats were eager to portray the wall as a colossal waste of money and the president as its mindless defender. Democrats’ underlying aim was not simply to defeat Trump but to do so in a way that was complete and humiliating. As soon as House Speaker Nancy Pelosi declared in January that there would not be one dollar for the wall, any chance of a workable compromise disappeared. Compromise is impossible when one side eliminates the grounds for compromise. The Dreamers were simply hapless victims in this raw display of partisan power. All that remained was for Republican congressional leaders to negotiate their terms of surrender. Otherwise, the president and Republicans would be blamed again for shutting down the government. The media played an important – and largely unrecognized – role in ignoring the Dreamers. With some exceptions, reporters and editors bought the story line as portrayed by Democrats that the wall was mostly a political symbol that wasn’t to be taken seriously. Coverage overlooked the plight of the Dreamers. The media, in effect, lined up behind Democrats. Their priority was embarrassing Trump, not reaching a pragmatic compromise. The question remains: When, if ever, will the Dreamers catch a break? Robert J. Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/great-recession-worse-than-great-depression/</link>
        <title>Great Recession worse than Great Depression?</title>
        <description>Surely the answer is “no.” In the 1930s, unemployment reached 25 percent. By contrast, the recent peak in the jobless rate was 10 percent. Case closed. Not so fast, objects economist J. Bradford DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley....</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 30 Nov 2018 09:03:07 -0700</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">7BBD2C9E-56A2-42F3-E053-0100007FDC6E</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – Here’s today’s economic quiz: Was the 2007-09 Great Recession more damaging than the Great Depression of the 1930s? Surely the answer is “no.” In the 1930s, unemployment reached 25 percent. By contrast, the recent peak in the jobless rate was 10 percent. Case closed. Not so fast, objects economist J. Bradford DeLong of the University of California, Berkeley. “Fifty years from now, historians will ... write that President Franklin Roosevelt, Congress and the Federal Reserve provided a collective policy response that was, if not optimal, at least respectable. ... By contrast, they will [argue] that the responses of President Barack Obama, Congress and the Federal Reserve did not come up to the standard [set by] the mid-1930s policy-makers.” Could DeLong be correct? The answer matters, because if he’s right, the economy -– despite its present strength -– faces a future of long-term sluggishness. Writing in The Milken Institute Review, an economics journal, DeLong accepts the conventional wisdom that the rapid response of the Federal Reserve and Congress to the Great Recession – the Fed lowered short-term interest rates to near zero, and Congress passed a huge stimulus package of spending increases and tax cuts – prevented a second Great Depression. But his praise stops there. We are now 11 years after the start of the crisis in 2007, and income per worker has risen only 7.5 percents. It had risen 10.5 percent 11 years after the 1929 stock-market crash. What explains the gap, he argues, is a psychological hangover from the Great Recession. Consumers and businesses are more cautious. He writes: “No unbiased observer projects anything other than slow growth, much slower than the years during and after World War II. Nobody is forecasting that the haunting will cease – that the shadow of the Great Recession will lift.” “We seem to have fumbled the recovery from the recession,” he adds, blaming bad policy. “Early in the recovery, left-center economists (like me) warned that cutting off stimulus prematurely in the name of deficit reduction or inflation-fighting would run huge risks,” he says. I’m sympathetic to DeLong’s analysis, having made somewhat similar arguments myself. The main difference is that I think that private caution may have some public virtue. It can dampen financial speculation and boom-bust cycles. Even granting this, I think DeLong overstates his case. Just how much the economy’s sluggish recovery can be attributed to Americans’ sour mood is unclear. The slowdown has two main causes: first, reduced growth of the labor force, as baby boomers retire; and second, slower growth in productivity -– the economic efficiency that raises wages, salaries and profits. In the 1950s, productivity growth averaged nearly 3 percent a year; in the last decade, the average is less than 1 percent. The retirement of baby-boom workers would have occurred without the Great Recession. The slowdown in productivity growth – reflecting technology, management and worker skills – is not well understood but may also be independent of the Great Recession. What’s particularly misleading is the contrast with the decades after World War II. As Stanford University historian David Kennedy points out in his Pulitzer-Prize winning “Freedom from Fear: the American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945”: “The young Americans who went off to war in the twilight years of the New Deal came home to a different country.” Victory and defense jobs restored confidence. Fifteen years of depression and war had left a huge backlog demand for cars, homes and appliances. The onset of the postwar baby boom further inflated demand, while shoppers – blocked by rationing from spending their incomes – were awash in savings, which could now be spent. Similarly, new technologies (television, plastics, air-conditioning, jet travel) boosted productivity. All these developments triggered a strong expansion. The circumstances today are much different. Households are trying to restore their savings after the excesses of the housing bubble more than a decade ago. The demographics – mainly aging – have also moved against a stronger recovery. Despite the internet, so has (it seems) technology. The lesson of history remains that the World War II economic boom played an essential role in ending the Depression. It wasn’t that policy-makers were smarter then than they are now. In fact, the opposite may be true. In 1940, the unemployment rate still exceeded 14 percent. It’s doubtful that many Americans would trade today’s economy for its pre-war predecessor. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/its-no-longer-the-economy-stupid-so-what-is-it/</link>
        <title>It’s no longer the economy, stupid – so what is it?</title>
        <description>This is unfamiliar. Economic progress has been a routine part of our election narratives. The presumption is that a strong economy favors the incumbent party; a weak economy doesn’t. We believe prosperity encourages loyalty to the larger promise of America....</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 13 Nov 2018 10:12:07 -0700</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">7A8FE7C3-54B5-2810-E053-0100007FB3F9</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – One lesson of the midterm elections is that economic growth is losing its power to unite the country and to reduce explosive conflicts over race, religion, ethnicity, immigrant status and sexuality This is unfamiliar. Economic progress has been a routine part of our election narratives. The presumption is that a strong economy favors the incumbent party; a weak economy doesn’t. We believe prosperity encourages loyalty to the larger promise of America. It reflects Americans’ self-identity. Getting ahead is something everyone can achieve – at least in theory. By contrast, race, religion, ethnicity and the like speak to a splintered society. Even a cursory review of presidential campaigns confirms the persistence of economic themes. In 1960, John Kennedy pledged to “get the country moving again.” Lyndon Johnson promised a “great society.” Ronald Reagan blamed Jimmy Carter for a sky-high “misery index” (the sum of inflation and the unemployment rate). In 1992, James Carville coined the pithy phrase: It’s the economy, stupid. There have been other issues: Vietnam, Watergate, crime and terrorism. But economic themes have always been at the forefront, or just behind. What is intriguing about the 2016 election and the recent midterms is that this relationship appears to be breaking down. Despite many problems, the economy in 2016 seemed strong enough to put Hillary Clinton in the White House. When voters went to the polls, the unemployment rate was 4.6 percent, annual inflation was only 1.7 percent, and median household income had increased 5 percent in 2015 from 2014. Similarly – and despite the usual midterm bias against the party of the incumbent president – the economy seemed healthy enough to help the Republicans retain control of the House. Unemployment was lower than in 2016 (3.7 percent), inflation was only a tad higher (2.3 percent). Median income has continued to advance. In a new book, “Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America,” political scientists John Sides of George Washington University, Michael Tesler of the University of California, Irvine, and Lynn Vavreck of the University of California, Los Angeles, argue that the last presidential campaign was a clash of identities, to borrow a phrase from the late political scientist Samuel Huntington. People saw their adversaries as threats to their own way of life – and, of course, were often urged to do so. Trump was proud of his ability to incite partisan crowds; Clinton was not totally blameless either, with her condescending reference to “deplorables.” Here’s how Sides, Tesler and Vavreck characterize the 2016 campaign: “Trump’s victory ... relied on activating people’s pre-existing views of racial, ethnic and religious minorities. ... Democrats reacted against Trump’s agenda. Thus, the alignment between partisanship and attitudes about issues like race and immigration only increased, and with it the likelihood of even more divisive politics. The resulting partisan polarization is the linchpin of America’s identity crisis.” Put slightly differently, we have a vicious circle. The anger on one side of the political spectrum feeds anger on the other. Polarization grows; people become more and more distrustful. Political scientists Alan Abramowitz and Steven Webster of Emory University have coined the useful term “negative partisanship,” by which they seem to mean that many Americans are more fearful of what the other party might do rather than enacting their own agenda. Public-opinion polls of both parties’ nominees found that “large majorities of Democrats and Republicans truly despised the opposing nominee,” they write. Fast forward to 2018. The Democrats seem to have done to the Republicans and Trump what the Republicans and Trump did to them in 2016. Despite the relatively robust economy, House Republicans lost badly; at this writing, Democrats have picked up 33 seats. Americans have a tendency to think that prosperity can cure almost any social and political problem. The experience of recent elections stands as a reminder that this sort of reasoning is often wishful thinking. Of course, the economy hasn’t permanently disappeared from political life. Given another recession (which, at some point, is inevitable) or financial crisis, its role would undoubtedly rebound. But meanwhile, it takes a back seat to today’s hateful partisanship. The purpose of politics – or, at any rate, one purpose – is to conciliate and to cooperate. On that score, we are in a bad place. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/ducking-hard-questions-we-all-lost-the-elections/</link>
        <title>Ducking hard questions, we all lost the elections</title>
        <description>They were a referendum on President Donald Trump, which suited both Republicans and Democrats just fine. Democrats were betting that the public had increasingly tired of Trump’s lies and his vile style. Trump and his supporters believed that Democrats were...</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 2018 11:07:37 -0700</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">7A03DE51-3F26-7B73-E053-0100007F876B</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – We all lost the fiercely contested midterm elections. They were a referendum on President Donald Trump, which suited both Republicans and Democrats just fine. Democrats were betting that the public had increasingly tired of Trump’s lies and his vile style. Trump and his supporters believed that Democrats were again underestimating his popular appeal. What was missing was any realistic engagement with the difficult issues facing the country. In democracies, elections serve not only to select the country’s leadership. They also aim to gauge public opinion on the hard issues and to see whether some sort of consensus is possible. The campaign featured very little of this constructive politics. What are some of the hard issues? There’s no secret. Start with budget deficits. In fiscal 2018, the gap between federal spending and revenues was $782 billion, nearly 4 percent of gross domestic product. That’s up $116 billion from 2017. Based on current spending and taxes, the Congressional Budget Office expects large deficits forever. With a 3.7 unemployment rate, no one can attribute these deficits to a weak economy. Put simply, Americans want more government benefits and services than they’re willing to pay for in taxes. Next, there’s immigration. The “wall” is a symbol for both sides. Opposition allows Trump to accuse Democrats of favoring “open borders,” raising the specter of a country overrun by foreigners. For pro-immigration groups, the wall symbolizes the simplicity and cruelty of Trump’s policies, highlighted by the separation of children from parents. Finally, global warming. For many Americans, this is the great moral issue of our time. But their fervor is not a policy, and the target of preventing global warming from exceeding 1.5 degrees Celsius (or 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit), measured from the pre-industrial era, is enormously difficult – probably impossible. What these three issues have in common is this: They’re all politically explosive. Take the budget. To eliminate the existing deficit would require tax receipts to increase by nearly 25 percent. Or we could reduce spending by a similar amount – that’s nearly $800 billion. The cut would exceed all military spending. Of course, we could also do nothing and gamble that permanently large deficits won’t someday cause a huge financial crisis. All the choices are bad. We should be debating the role of government and how it can be financed. Instead, our political leaders are making proposals that would worsen deficits. Trump backs more tax cuts; Democrats advance expensive new health benefits and guaranteed jobs for all. Or consider immigration. As a society, the United States has a decent record in assimilating millions of newcomers. But – as today’s turmoil demonstrates – too much immigration can fracture society and radicalize politics. The magnitude of immigration is undeniable. One in four people living in the United States is either an immigrant (41 million, 13 percent of the population) or the U.S.-born child of immigrants (37 million, 12 percent), reports a study by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. Against that backdrop, reasonable compromises should be possible. We ought to be debating the terms: a path to citizenship for most of today’s illegal immigrants; some sort of wall; strict penalties on employers for hiring illegals; a switch from family connections to skill-based immigration. Similarly, any realistic effort to deal with global warming would be difficult and, quite probably, unpopular. Stabilizing the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide would require replacing virtually all fossil fuels (oil, coal, natural gas), which now supply roughly four-fifths of the world’s energy. Prices would rise and government regulations would become more intrusive. Candor would have compelled our political leaders to warn us that sensible policies – on the budget, on immigration and even climate change – require patience and sacrifice. We no longer have the luxury of simply ignoring what we don’t like or what we find inconvenient or expensive. This is, of course, among the hardest challenges facing democracies: to accept short-term costs for long-term gains. Under the best of circumstances, it would be difficult to achieve. Politicians want to win. By and large, they tell voters what voters want to hear, even if it is exaggerated, selective or dishonest. But the fixation on Trump and his antics turned a longshot into an impossibility. It destroyed the prospects of anything resembling rational debate. Indeed, public opinion may be worse informed at the end of this campaign than at the beginning. In this sense, the campaign may have been wasted. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/solving-climate-change-may-well-be-impossible/</link>
        <title>Solving climate change may well be impossible</title>
        <description>Unless we make dramatic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane and others), warns the IPCC, we face a future of rapidly rising temperatures that will destroy virtually all the world’s coral reefs, intensify droughts and raise sea levels....</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 16 Oct 2018 09:03:14 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">784A264E-4EC1-2BD1-E053-0100007F0B8C</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – If there were any doubt before, there should be none now. “Solving” the global climate change problem may be humankind’s mission impossible. That’s the gist of the latest report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the United Nations group charged with monitoring global warming. Unless we make dramatic reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (carbon dioxide, methane and others), warns the IPCC, we face a future of rapidly rising temperatures that will destroy virtually all the world’s coral reefs, intensify droughts and raise sea levels. We need to take action immediately, if not sooner. The IPCC says that emissions need to be cut 45 percent from present levels by 2030 and virtually eliminated by 2050. This would keep the projected increase in global temperatures since the early 1800s to 1.5 degrees centigrade, or 2.7 degrees Fahrenheit. We would escape the worst consequences of global warming. It’s not clear how this would be done. The reality is that global carbon emissions are rising, not falling. Emissions today are about 60 percent higher than in 1990, according to the World Bank. There are at least three obstacles frustrating the IPCC’s agenda. First, we don’t have the technologies to reduce and eventually eliminate emissions from fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural gas). Yes, solar and wind power have made advances, but they still provide only a tiny share of the world’s total energy, about 4 percent. Electric vehicles don’t solve the problem, because natural gas and coal are the underlying energy sources for much of the electricity. Second, even if we had the technologies to replace fossil fuels, it’s doubtful that we have the political will to do so. Democracies – or, for that matter, dictatorships – have a difficult time inflicting present political pain for future, hypothetical societal gains. Voters abhor higher gasoline and heating-oil prices, which are an integral part of most proposed solutions for global warming. They would dampen demand for fossil fuels and spur investment in substitutes. The clearest proof of America’s political bias against the future is the treatment of Social Security and Medicare. For decades, we have known that an aging population would significantly boost spending for these programs. What did we do to prepare for this inevitability? Not much. Finally, assuming (unrealistically) that today’s advanced societies – led by the United States – overcome these obstacles, it’s unclear whether poorer and so-called “emerging market” countries would follow suit. These countries represent the largest increases in fossil-fuel demand, as they attempt to raise living standards. Already, China is the world’s largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, nearly twice as high as the United States. Consider air conditioners. The world now has 1.6 billion air conditioning units, reports the International Energy Agency. By 2050, that could triple to 5.6 billion units. People in advanced societies won’t abandon air conditioning, and people in poorer countries won’t surrender the chance to enjoy it. Much of future demand will come from three countries – China, India and Indonesia. What is to be done? Maybe nothing. This seems to be the choice made by many Republicans and the Trump administration, which is withdrawing from the Paris agreement’s commitments to reduce emissions. Trump’s hostility is not as crazy as it sounds. If suppressing global warming is as hard as I’ve argued, one likely response is a series of half measures that don’t much affect global warming but do weaken economic growth. The politicians’ real aim is to brag that they’ve “done something” when all they’ve really done is delude us. Trump would skip this stage. My own preference is messier and subject to all the above shortcomings. I would gradually impose a stiff fossil-fuel tax (not a 10 or 15 percent tax but a doubling or maybe a tripling of prices) to discourage fossil-fuel use and encourage new energy sources. In addition, some of the tax revenues could reduce budget deficits and simplify income taxes. With luck, a genuine breakthrough might occur: perhaps advances in electric batteries or storage. That would make wind and solar power more practical. There are risks. It can be argued that this sort of policy, aside from relying on unpopular energy taxes, would represent a triumph of hope over experience. Combating global warming is a noble crusade, but it’s much harder than the rhetoric implies. If we were serious about cutting greenhouse gases, we could adopt comprehensive wartime controls that empower the government to mandate changes. Or we could accept a worldwide depression as a way to quash job growth and greenhouse gases. Obviously, neither is in the cards. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/will-the-next-financial-crisis-come-as-a-stranger/</link>
        <title>Will the next financial crisis come as a stranger?</title>
        <description>A decade after the onset of the 2008-09 global financial crisis – an event usually dated to the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros. – the world economy seems to be repairing itself. To be sure, worries remain. The latest is that...</description>
        <pubDate>Fri, 07 Sep 2018 16:03:09 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">754D18EF-4694-0B5F-E053-0100007F9178</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – The news is better than you might think. A decade after the onset of the 2008-09 global financial crisis – an event usually dated to the bankruptcy of Lehman Bros. – the world economy seems to be repairing itself. To be sure, worries remain. The latest is that overborrowed “emerging-market” countries – Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Turkey and the like – may cause a new crisis. If they can’t earn (through trade) the dollars needed to repay loans, they would default and perhaps trigger contagion. Frightened investors would flee other emerging-market countries. President Donald Trump’s trade wars magnify the danger. This prognosis is sobering; it may also be too pessimistic. In a new report, the McKinsey Global Institute – the research arm of the famed management consulting firm – has summarized the financial changes, for good and ill, that have occurred in these 10 years. There are pluses and minuses, but on balance the pluses seem to prevail. Here’s a rundown of McKinsey’s score card. (1) American and some European consumers have reduced their debts significantly, presumably by paying down existing debts and limiting new borrowing. American consumers cut their debt by the equivalent of 19 percentage points of gross domestic product, about $3.8 trillion in today’s dollars.Most of this debt presumably reflected cuts in home mortgages. Other countries with real estate booms also cut borrowing: Spain’s consumer debt fell 20 percentage points as a share of GDP; the United Kingdom’s dropped by 6 percent of GDP. Lower debts make it easier for households to continue spending, rather than diverting money to repaying loans. (2) Cross-border movements of money – referred to as “capital flows” by economists – have declined dramatically, about 50 percent, since their peak in 2007. The dollar amounts are breathtaking, from $12 trillion to $6 trillion in 2017. “With less money flowing across borders,” says McKinsey, “the risk of a 2008-style crisis ricocheting around the world has been reduced.”Capital flows involve foreigners investing in other countries’ stocks, bonds, bank deposits or making “foreign direct investment” (buying existing companies or building factories and businesses). European banks especially have retrenched. “Two-thirds of the assets of German banks, for instance, were outside of Germany in 2007, but that is now down to one-third,” says McKinsey. (3) Global “imbalances” – large trade surpluses or deficits – have diminished. The best-known are the chronic U.S. trade deficits and China’s sizable surpluses.But as McKinsey notes, the actual current account imbalances have shrunk, even though the rhetoric from Trump and others suggest just the opposite. Reports McKinsey: “China’s surplus reached 9.9 percent of GDP at its peak in 2007 but is now down to just 1.4 percent of GDP. The U.S. deficit hit 5.9 percent of GDP in its peak at 2006 but had declined to 2.4 percent by 2017.” Though impressive, all these improvements need to be qualified. There are still many negatives. Although consumer debt as a share of GDP has fallen in many countries, it’s increased in others. In Australia, Canada, Switzerland and South Korea, “household debt is now substantially higher than it was prior to the crisis.” Housing bubbles are plausible. Or take capital flows. Despite the sizable declines from their peak, global capital flows are still about 50 percent higher than in 2000. Similarly, China has increasingly relied heavily on debt – lent to state enterprises and other businesses – to stimulate economic growth. Its total debt (government, business and household) has grown from 145 percent of GDP in 2007 to 256 percent in 2017. The ultimate horror of debt-heavy economies is that, without rapid economic growth, borrowers can’t service their debts – and if they can’t service their debts, economic growth will slow even more. There are definitely grounds for worry, including the unknown. As McKinsey puts it: “One thing we know from history is that the next crisis will not look like the last one. If 2008 taught us anything, it’s the importance of being vigilant when times are still good.” Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/samuelson-could-lehman-brothers-have-been-saved/</link>
        <title>Samuelson: Could Lehman Brothers have been saved?</title>
        <description>As we approach the 10th anniversary of Lehman’s collapse (Sept. 15), these questions won’t go away. The Lehman bankruptcy is portrayed as the pivotal event that converted severe – but familiar – disruptions in financial markets into a full-blown panic....</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 27 Aug 2018 00:44:27 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">746606F1-845B-49F4-E053-0100007F131E</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=D5FE4454-C5A5-4F0B-BDDA-17D3773386E9&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=D5FE4454-C5A5-4F0B-BDDA-17D3773386E9&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – Who lost Lehman Brothers? As we approach the 10th anniversary of Lehman’s collapse (Sept. 15), these questions won’t go away. The Lehman bankruptcy is portrayed as the pivotal event that converted severe – but familiar – disruptions in financial markets into a full-blown panic. Nothing like it had occurred in the United States since the Great Depression of the 1930s. Stocks fell; unemployment soared. The skeptics argue that, if Lehman had been rescued, the economy would have fared much better. The officials who handled the Lehman bankruptcy aren’t having it. They contend they did all they could. Lehman was too far gone to be saved, except at exorbitant public expense. That’s the position of former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, ex-Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Timothy Geithner, then president of the New York Federal Reserve. The most biting criticism comes from economist Laurence Ball of Johns Hopkins University, who has written an angry book about Lehman (“The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Setting the record straight on a financial disaster”). Even those who reject Ball’s conclusions will find his analysis highly detailed and clearly written.du1-i-syn He has few doubts. “The truth is that Lehman’s failure could have been avoided, and that policymakers did not need to be particularly clever to achieve that outcome,” Ball writes. Recall the nature of Lehman’s business. Like other investment banks – say, Goldman Sachs – it borrowed short-term money, with maturities as brief as one day at low interest rates, and used these funds for lending and investing at (hopefully) higher interest rates and returns. As of Aug. 31, 2008 – two weeks before its bankruptcy – Lehman had about $600 billion in assets (bonds, stocks, other investments) and $572 billion in borrowings. Shareholder equity was $28 billion ($600 billion minus $572 billion). From these numbers, you can see why Lehman was vulnerable. If its assets fell 5 percent ($30 billion), its stockholders’ equity would be wiped out. If its short-term lenders wouldn’t renew their loans, Lehman’s assets would have been dumped onto markets at distressed prices. Both misfortunes befell Lehman. Its assets lost value, and its short-term lenders deserted. The Fed could have rescued Lehman by lending it the money needed to replace the fleeing short-term lenders, Ball argues. The response from Paulson and company was: Legally, we couldn’t do it. The loans probably would have been made under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, which permitted the Fed to make emergency loans under “unusual and exigent circumstances.” But the Fed’s freedom was not unfettered; it couldn’t just throw money at the problem. Fed officials felt that there had to be good prospects that the loan would be repaid – and they couldn’t make that finding. Here’s where Ball’s analysis becomes questionable: At times, he almost accuses Paulson, Bernanke and Geithner of lying about Lehman. This is unfair and inaccurate. Up until the bankruptcy, they tried to find a private buyer for Lehman. There were no takers; talks with Bank of America and Barclays broke down. At this point, Paulson seems to have decided – for personal, political and policy reasons – that letting Lehman fail was the least bad alternative. Personally, Paulson despised the label “Mr. Bailout,” which had attached to him after the rescue of Bear Stearns, another investment bank, in March 2008. Politically, Wall Street bailouts were enormously unpopular. Finally, letting Lehman fail might be good policy. It would discipline speculation. “Too big to fail” would be repudiated. Paulson and many economists seemed to take this view. After Lehman’s bankruptcy, Harvard economist Ken Rogoff wrote approvingly in The Washington Post that the decision showed Wall Street that financial regulators “are not such creampuffs after all.” This reasoning soon disappeared as Lehman’s wider effects became apparent. Ball also strays in suggesting that rescuing Lehman would have subdued the financial crisis. This seems doubtful. It didn’t happen after the bailout of Bear Stearns; it didn’t happen after Paulson seized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The central causes of the crisis were years of lax credit decisions that left many financial institutions riddled with losses. These couldn’t be wished away. If Lehman were rescued, runs on other institutions would almost certainly have continued. The decisions were being made under enormous time pressures and incomplete information: the fog of crisis. One way or another, a debacle was unavoidable. What’s necessary now is to draw the right lessons from this financial calamity. Unfortunately, we’re going in the wrong direction. Reflecting public hostility toward Wall Street “bailouts,” Congress tightened the rules governing Fed lending under Section 13(3) in 2010. This made perfect sense politically – and no sense economically. In some future crisis, the Fed needs the freedom to protect the financial system. Restricting that freedom flirts with chaos. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/samuelson-welcome-to-the-age-of-malware/</link>
        <title>Samuelson: Welcome to the age of malware</title>
        <description>Samuelson, Washington Postdu1-i-syn For years, we have regarded personal computers, the internet, smartphones and various digital devices as evidence that America continues to dominate the central new technology of our time. Just last week, Apple attained a stock market value...</description>
        <pubDate>Wed, 08 Aug 2018 23:39:44 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">72FB0898-41BF-79FB-E053-0100007FD541</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=BC0E76E8-0285-4BED-94DD-B6EF57182BE1&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=BC0E76E8-0285-4BED-94DD-B6EF57182BE1&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Samuelson, Washington Postdu1-i-syn WASHINGTON — Welcome to the Age of Malware. It promises to be a huge downer and, possibly, a great tragedy. For years, we have regarded personal computers, the internet, smartphones and various digital devices as evidence that America continues to dominate the central new technology of our time. Just last week, Apple attained a stock market value of $1 trillion, the first company ever to do so. This seemed yet again to confirm American leadership. The reality, of course, is much different. By now, millions of Americans – probably most – must recognize that the internet and its digital sidekicks constitute a double-edged sword. They provide services (photography, maps, email) that now seem indispensable. Yet, the same technologies increasingly pose a fundamental threat to our way of life. Hardly a day goes by without news reports of the internet being used to undermine our democracy, steal people’s personal information (names, Social Security numbers, credit scores, health data and the like), hijack corporate secrets and attack “critical infrastructure” – the power grid, financial and communications networks, water and transportation systems. Many Americans remain in a state of confused denial. We simply cannot bring ourselves to acknowledge that such promising technologies can be turned against us in such destructive ways. The injection of malware – computer software (“viruses”) that aims to corrupt legitimate data systems – has become an everyday occurrence. Other digital vulnerabilities abound. Just recently, the Pentagon curtailed military personnel from using global positioning devices, because they can help adversaries monitor our troop movements. Anyone who doubts cyber’s unintended consequences should read David Sanger’s new book “The Perfect Weapon: War, Sabotage, and Fear in the Cyber Age.” Sanger, a reporter for The New York Times, has been a dogged and diligent observer of cybersecurity issues for years. His book is a readable account of what went wrong. It’s difficult for Americans to deal with these questions, because we want to play both sides. We deplore other countries’ (read Russia, China, Iran and North Korea) use of the internet to attack their geopolitical or commercial rivals. But we are not innocent victims. Sanger rates Stuxnet, a joint U.S.-Israeli virus that temporarily destroyed Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, as a highly successful use of the internet for strategic purposes. Similarly, Sanger presents much circumstantial evidence that, via the internet, the U.S. caused North Korean missiles to fail. (Kim Jong Un apparently solved this problem by changing rocket designs.) Still, Sanger is not overly impressed with U.S. cyberagencies, partly because they couldn’t protect their own data. The National Security Agency – the citadel of the government’s cyberskills – experienced the theft by Edward Snowden and a successful hacking by a group called Shadow Brokers, thought to be Russian. The heist involved NSA’s own cyber “tools” used to gain entry into other countries’ data systems. The gravest dangers involve hacking “critical infrastructure” – power plants and the like – which could cause widespread public disorder and chaos. At a recent public briefing, the Department of Homeland Security conceded that foreign (presumably Russian) hackers have penetrated some utilities and could have turned off the electricity. Warfare has changed. By Sanger’s description, there are at least four defining characteristics of the new cyberwarfare. First, compared to large and expensive armies and navies, a cybercapability is inexpensive. “Cyber weapons are so cheap to develop and so easy to hide that they have proven irresistible” for large and small powers alike, writes Sanger. This implies a proliferation of cybercapabilities, including for non-state actors. Second, “Unless shooting breaks out, it will always be unclear if we are at peace or war,” he argues. “Governments that cannot stand up to far larger powers with conventional armies will have little incentive to give up the advantages that cyberweapons offer. We are living in a gray zone, one of constant digital conflict.” Cyberwarriors of all varieties will constantly be testing their own capabilities. Third, the advantage lies mostly with the attacker. There are thousands upon thousands of potential entry points into various data networks. Even if defenders plug most of them, an attacker needs to find only one to launch an attack. Fourth, although improvements have occurred in resisting cyberattacks, they are insufficient because new networks, autonomous cars, for example, are being created all the time. “We are getting better. But we are getting worse faster,” one expert tells Sanger. The Age of Malware is upon us. There is no obvious technical fix for our love affair with the internet. We need to recognize that the things we like about the internet are the same things that make us vulnerable to its dangers. There is no clear separation of the good from the bad. We are flirting with national disaster if we don’t curb our internet appetite. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/samuelson-productivity-boom-think-again/</link>
        <title>Samuelson: Productivity boom? Think again</title>
        <description>du1-i-syn To answer that question, the Senate appointed a commission, headed by Stanford economist Michael Boskin, to weigh the evidence. In late 1996, the Boskin Commission, as it was known, released its findings: Inflation – defined as increases in the...</description>
        <pubDate>Thu, 02 Aug 2018 09:47:04 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">7276A1F4-206A-634B-E053-0100007F6081</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=2D6D0C04-6F89-4831-911F-6DD46973BBB0&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=2D6D0C04-6F89-4831-911F-6DD46973BBB0&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[du1-i-syn WASHINGTON — Let’s travel back in time to 1995. Most Americans still remembered the calamitous inflation of the late 1970s (prices rose 13 percent in 1979). Many federal benefits, including Social Security, were (and are) tied to inflation. But was the inflation overstated, as many economists thought? If so, the economy might be doing better than reported. To answer that question, the Senate appointed a commission, headed by Stanford economist Michael Boskin, to weigh the evidence. In late 1996, the Boskin Commission, as it was known, released its findings: Inflation – defined as increases in the consumer price index, or CPI – was overstated by 1.1 percentage points. If, for example, the year-to-year increase in the CPI was 4 percent, the actual rate was closer to 3 percent. Since then, have we made any progress? Well, yes and no. But first let’s recall what the Boskin Commission found. The largest problem, accounting for about half the overstatement, involved new products or improvements in existing ones. Suppose you bought a tire that got 20 percent more mileage than its predecessor, but there was no price increase. In reality, you got a 20 percent price cut. But the index often missed these price cuts, because adjusting for quality is hard. A similar problem afflicted new products – personal computers, internet services, microwave ovens and the like. When they were introduced into the CPI, their existing gains weren’t counted as price cuts. Only after the product was inserted into the CPI were future price cuts recognized. There were other omissions. One was shifting buying habits, what economists call “substitution.” If the price of beef went up, some consumers would switch to chicken at lower prices. These price cuts were undercounted. So were consumers’ tendency to shop at stores (Walmart, Target) with lower prices. These price cuts were also undercounted. (Economists’ label for this miscounting is “outlet bias,” meaning that the statistics don’t accurately reflect consumers’ actual behavior.) Just how much of the economy’s changes in output represent price increases and how much represent real shifts in production is a crucial question. If price increases are overestimated, then the economy’s output, productivity and living standards are underestimated. Two decades later, there’s been some good news. In a just-released paper by the Brookings Institution, Brent Moulton – a former top official of the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) – argues that dozens of small, technical changes over the years by the BEA and the Labor Department’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) have reduced inflationary bias. Moulton now estimates the bias at 0.85 percentage points, down from the Boskin Commission’s 1.1 percentage points. The improvement is almost a quarter. The CPI is “updated much more frequently, enabling new goods and services to enter ... more rapidly,” Moulton wrote. The producer price index (PPI), which measures wholesale prices, has increased its coverage of service providers -- lawyers, architects, insurance agents. To Greg Ip, The Wall Street Journal’s economics columnist, the data debunk the notion of a “stealth productivity boom,” a vast amount of production, enabled by new technologies, that is missed by conventional statistics. “Even if all the benefits of social networks, online shopping and less invasive surgery were being [properly] measured, it probably wouldn’t change the overall picture,” he wrote. Because the gap between measured and unmeasured inflation has narrowed, so has the likelihood of a huge, invisible productivity dividend. Still, the problem of counting accurately will be with us forever. The reason: There’s a constant inflow of new products and services that aren’t easy to measure, health care and education being obvious examples. There’s another point: Groups whose government benefits are tied to inflation – notably Social Security recipients – don’t necessarily want better statistics. So even when improvements are within our grasp, they are not adopted. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/trade-wars-and-the-247-trillion-global-debt-bomb/</link>
        <title>Trade wars and the $247 trillion global debt bomb</title>
        <description>du1-i-syn Households, businesses and governments borrow on the assumption that they will service their debts either by paying the principle and interest or by rolling over the debts into new loans. But this works only if incomes grow fast enough...</description>
        <pubDate>Sat, 14 Jul 2018 04:52:10 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">70F44878-9E38-4DE5-E053-0100007F3305</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=9D07543A-0B7F-408A-BF87-5A5D0D74DB93&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=9D07543A-0B7F-408A-BF87-5A5D0D74DB93&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[du1-i-syn WASHINGTON – The untold story of the world economy – so far at least – is the potentially explosive interaction between the spreading trade war and the overhang of global debt, estimated at a staggering $247 trillion. That’s “trillion” with a “t.” The numbers so large as to be almost incomprehensible. Households, businesses and governments borrow on the assumption that they will service their debts either by paying the principle and interest or by rolling over the debts into new loans. But this works only if incomes grow fast enough to make the debts bearable or to justify new loans. When those ingredients go missing, delinquencies, defaults and (at worse) panics follow. Here’s where the trade war and debt may intersect disastrously. Since 2003, global debt has soared. As a share of the world economy (gross domestic product), the increase went from 248 percent of GDP to 318 percent. In the first quarter of 2018 alone, global debt rose by a huge $8 trillion. The figures include all major countries and most types of debt: consumer, business and government. But to service these debts requires rising incomes, while an expanding trade war threatens to squeeze incomes. The resort to more tariffs and trade restrictions will make it harder for borrowers to pay their debts. At best, this could slow the global economy. At worst, it could trigger another financial crisis. Note that the danger is worldwide. It’s not specific to the United States. In a new report, the Institute of International Finance, an industry research and advocacy group, says that the debts of some “emerging market” countries (Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina) seem vulnerable to roll-over risk: the inability to replace expiring loans. In 2018 and 2019, about $1 trillion of dollar-denominated emerging-market debt is maturing, says the IIF. Debt can either stimulate or retard economic growth, depending on the circumstances. Now we’re approaching a turning point, according to Hung Tran, the IIF’s executive managing director. If debt growth is not sustainable, as Tran believes, new lending will slow or stop. Borrowers will have to devote more of their cash flow to servicing existing debts. At a briefing, Tran described the change this way: “(We had) a goldilocks economy, with decent economic growth. Inflation was nowhere to be seen, allowing central banks (the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank) to be more accommodative (i.e., keeping interest rates low). You could always roll over your debt. “However, the probability of this continuing is much less now. ... Trade tensions are on the rise, and this has already impacted (business confidence) and the willingness to invest.” Inflation is also creeping up. To stall its rise, the Fed is raising interest rates. Trade protectionism compounds the problem, because many non-U.S. companies borrow in dollars. (Dollars are widely used in trade even if neither the importer nor the exporter is American.) But these loans must be repaid in dollars. If tit-for-tat protectionism dampens trade, getting those dollars will become harder. Loan delinquencies and defaults may rise. Tran isn’t predicting a full-scale panic resembling the 2008-09 financial crisis, and there are some reasons for optimism. Banks are better capitalized now than before the crisis. (Bank capital – shareholders’ funds or loans – protect against losses.) People are also more sensitive to the dangers than a decade ago. Evidence of this comes from a recent “stress test” performed on 35 large bank holding companies by the Fed. A deep recession was simulated; the unemployment rate rose to 10 percent. Despite large losses, no bank failed. Since 2009, these banks have added $800 billion in common equity capital, says the Fed. What Tran is suggesting is a global shift away from debt-financed economic growth. The meaning of the $247 trillion debt overhang is that many countries (including China, India and other emerging-market countries) will be dealing with the consequences of high or unsustainable debts, whether borne by consumers, businesses or governments. There will be a collective impact on the global economy. “If you are in a high-debt situation, you need to bring the debt down, either absolutely or as a share of GDP,” he said at the briefing. “(Either) will result in slower economic growth. You don’t have the borrowing needed to maintain strong investment and consumption spending.” This may represent a final chapter to the 2008-09 financial crisis. The low interest rates adopted by central banks were justified as necessary to avoid a worldwide depression. Critics worried that cheap credit would rationalize risky lending that couldn’t survive higher rates. We may soon discover who’s right. Robert Samuelson is an economist and columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/samuelson-neo-isolationist-policies-wont-work-in-this-era/</link>
        <title>Samuelson: Neo-isolationist policies won’t work in this era</title>
        <description>du1-i-syn Keep this in mind on the Fourth. Let us assume – for the sake of argument – that Trump is everything that he isn’t: thoughtful, considerate, open-minded, kind, generous, civil, truthful and respectful of his adversaries. Let us further...</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jul 2018 23:39:25 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">702670DF-57B6-5527-E053-0100007F11D1</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=C48EAA05-388F-4EA7-A8E6-53555335241D&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=C48EAA05-388F-4EA7-A8E6-53555335241D&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[du1-i-syn WASHINGTON – On this July Fourth, America has taken a turn for the worst. The great delusion of Donald Trump’s presidency is that we can thrive by embracing nationalism even though major economic and political events are increasingly driven by international forces. Trump is an isolationist in an era of globalism. It won’t work. Keep this in mind on the Fourth. Let us assume – for the sake of argument – that Trump is everything that he isn’t: thoughtful, considerate, open-minded, kind, generous, civil, truthful and respectful of his adversaries. Let us further assume that this imaginary Trump is such a nice guy that his character is widely admired. Still, a big problem would remain: his policies. It’s inaccurate to say that Trump doesn’t have an agenda. In many ways, his agenda resonates with his campaign promises. “Make America Great Again” is a brilliant slogan that captures a nostalgic urge to resurrect an allegedly more glorious past. The trouble is the actual past doesn’t resemble Trump’s rhetorical past, which is widely taken to be America in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The country was much poorer then. Since 1960, the average income (gross domestic product per person) has roughly tripled after adjusting for inflation. In 2017, that was $59,484. Many staples of modern life didn’t exist or were in short supply. Jet travel began in 1958. Color TV became widespread only in the 1960s. In 1955, only 2 percent of homes had air conditioning. There were more important deficiencies: African-Americans throughout the South remained segregated by law and custom; the situation was better in the North, but blacks still faced discrimination. Similarly, most women remained at home; career jobs for them were only slowly expanding. One accomplishment that did make America “great” then was its active international engagement, through military alliances and trade policies. These helped Europe and Japan rebuild after World War II and resist communist political pressures. This is precisely the sort of international cooperation – protecting our long-term interests despite some short-term costs – that qualifies as enlightened self-interest. It is doubtful that most Americans, when confronted with the tangible conditions of early post-World War II life, would choose to hop on a time machine and re-establish themselves in this bygone era. Meanwhile, Trump is enthusiastically repudiating, or trying to repudiate, the American-led international cooperation that was a hallmark of the period. The underlying lesson was that our power and influence are enhanced when they are exercised in conjunction with countries that, granting differences and disagreements, share our basic values and interests. We cannot isolate ourselves from the rest of the world. To the contrary, power is being drained from nation states to “market forces” or other global mechanisms that are difficult to control. This has been going on since at least the mid-19th century and reflects new communication and transportation technologies: the telegraph, the telephone, television, the internet, automobiles, planes and containerization. Obviously, no one is going to uninvent these technologies. But the globalized world that those technologies have helped foster understandably makes many, possibly most, people uneasy and fearful because there is a loss of sovereign control over our future. Think of all the interconnections. Millions of migrants cross national borders annually (in 2017, 258 million people lived outside their country of birth, reports the OECD). Supply chains straddle the globe. Threats of worldwide epidemics are ever-present. Cyberattacks are already common. Billions of dollars of investment funds routinely shift from one country to another. Climate change cannot be dealt with unilaterally. The prospect of a major shooting war exists . To this anxious litany Trump brings a reassuring antidote: more nationalism. It’s a false remedy. Some of Trump’s efforts to control globalization have already backfired. To wit: Harley-Davidson’s decision to move some production to Europe in response to Europe’s higher tariffs on Harley bikes, which in turn were a reaction to Trump’s higher tariffs on European steel and aluminum exports. As before, our global power and influence benefit when we cooperate and respect our allies, not vilify them. Trump cannot deconstruct globalization. It is too big and well-entrenched. But as noted by Wall Street Journal columnist Greg Ip, Trump can damage it and weaken it by prescribing protectionism. Economic growth would suffer. It’s not just Trump. Albeit without his vicious rhetoric, many Democrats share the same nationalism, proof that it represents a potent political symbol. Foreigners are convenient scapegoats. There is also a deeper problem: Economics, which is increasingly global, has outpaced politics, which is mostly local. What we had more of in the 1950s is hope and confidence. But they cannot be restored by reverting to a destructive neo-isolationism. It may be popular, but it’s not practical. As noted, we’ve taken a turn for the worst. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/current-crisis-in-italy-threatens-global-economy/</link>
        <title>Current crisis in Italy threatens global economy</title>
        <description>Under the worst-case assumptions, Italy could abandon the euro – the single currency now used by 19 countries – and experience a full-blown financial meltdown that would end in a deep recession. Other countries might well be caught in the...</description>
        <pubDate>Sat, 02 Jun 2018 05:05:53 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">6DA2028A-EFC9-24C8-E053-0100007FD997</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – If you’re nostalgic for the 2008-09 financial crisis, you can cheer up. Another debacle may be on its way. Its epicenter would be Italy, which may threaten the rest of the world economy. Under the worst-case assumptions, Italy could abandon the euro – the single currency now used by 19 countries – and experience a full-blown financial meltdown that would end in a deep recession. Other countries might well be caught in the economic downdraft. Already, that’s roiled global markets in stocks, bonds and currencies. Recall that Italy’s government debt now equals about 130 percent of its economy (gross domestic product). If investors fear they won’t be repaid, they’ll rush to sell Italian bonds to limit their losses. That, perversely, would lower bond prices, raise interest rates and possibly trigger a panic. Although this logic has long been true, it has taken on new urgency since the last Italian election in March, when, unexpectedly, the two leading populist parties, the leftish Five Star Movement and the far-right League, scored huge gains. It’s an unholy alliance, “as if Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump got together,” says Jacob Funk Kirkegaard of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a think tank. The result was a joint economic agenda that, if enacted, would explode Italy’s debt, say critics. The plan includes tax cuts, a minimum guaranteed income and higher old-age pensions. The Peterson Institute estimates the package’s cost between 6 and 7 percent of GDP. To prevent Italy from abandoning the euro, President Sergio Mattarella rejected the populists’ proposed government and effectively mandated a new election, which could occur as early as summer. It’s a risky strategy, given widespread Italian hostility toward Brussels, the capital of the European Union. “If the League wins the election,” says Kirkegaard, “it would be interpreted that Italians want to leave the euro.” Even so, Italians would be big losers if the economy nose-dived. Two-thirds of Italy’s bonds, reports the Peterson Institute, are held by Italians – individuals, banks, pensions, insurance companies. Italy’s larger problem is that it has too much government debt and not enough economic growth to reduce it. “Remarkably, Italy’s per capita income is lower today than it was on the eve of the country’s euro adoption in 1999,” writes economist Desmond Lachman of the American Enterprise Institute. In recent years, annual economic growth has been virtually non-existent; from 2010 to 2017, it averaged annually two-tenths of 1 percent, according to figures from the International Monetary Fund. As Lachman points out, only Greece has a higher debt-to-GDP ratio among countries in the Eurozone. But the big difference is that Italy’s economy is 10 times as large as Greece’s, while its outstanding government debt of $2.5 trillion is the third largest in the world, just behind Japan and the United States. Italy’s present turmoil is a sobering reminder of the shortcomings of the euro itself. It deprives its member countries of the flexibility of devaluing their individual national currencies as one way of restoring their global competitiveness. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group.]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/our-new-capitalism-strikingly-resembles-the-old/</link>
        <title>Our new capitalism strikingly resembles the old</title>
        <description>That has been true for most of our history. To be sure, economic change now abounds: The internet; vast U.S. budget deficits; high private and public debt levels in both affluent and developing nations; the rise of China; growing income...</description>
        <pubDate>Sat, 19 May 2018 05:04:41 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">6C7F5169-6484-2BFE-E053-0100007FECA4</guid>
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – We flatter ourselves into thinking that we live in a time of exceptional economic upheaval. The truth is that the present resembles the past. What we learned – and forget – is that a dynamic economy is inherently destructive. But the periodic convulsions often create long-term benefits. That has been true for most of our history. To be sure, economic change now abounds: The internet; vast U.S. budget deficits; high private and public debt levels in both affluent and developing nations; the rise of China; growing income and wealth inequality; immigration; an aging population; “globalization” – not just trade in goods and services but huge cross-border money flows. And so on. The very nature of the economy seems to be shifting, to what we do not know. Our sense of security is shaken. It’s all true. But it’s always been true. The same contradictory mix of awe and anxiety applies to most, if not all, previous economic eras. Indeed, by comparison to some, today’s economy seems placid. A few years ago, a friend gave me a copy of a book called Recent Economic Changes, published in 1890 and written by David A. Wells, one of the leading American economists of the late 19th century. Browsing through the book, it’s hard not to be struck by the parallels between then and now. Here’s how Wells opens his almost 500 pages of commentary: “The economic changes that have occurred during the last quarter of a century – or during the present generation of living men – have unquestionably been more important and varied than during any former corresponding period of the world’s history.” Sound familiar? In Wells’ time, there had been astonishing advances in transportation, communications and manufacturing. Steam had replaced wind as the main energy source for water-borne transportation. The railroad had displaced carriages and wagons. In 1869, the Suez Canal opened; coincidentally, so did the first transcontinental railroad in the United States. In 1800, it took an average of 42 days for a traveler to go from New York to the then tiny outpost of Chicago; by the eve of the Civil War, the transit time had dropped to two days, according to the Historical Statistics of the United States, Millennial Edition. Faster trains and more tracks lowered transportation costs. From 1859 to 1890, railroad mileage grew almost 20 times, from 9,021 miles to 166,703 miles. This was the era when America urbanized and industrialized. In 1860, four out of five Americans lived in rural areas; by 1900, the population had almost tripled to 76 million, and 40 percent lived in urban areas. Manufacturing exploded. By comparison, many of today’s economic advances seem mild. The rise of great cities was surely more important to daily life than the advent of Facebook or Instagram. For all the amazing, frustrating and infuriating things that digital technology can do, its effects are overshadowed by the social and economic cataclysms of the last half of the 19th century. Of course, there was a backlash then, just as today. These advances have resulted, wrote Wells, “in the absolute destruction of large amounts of capital through new inventions and discoveries and in the impairment of even greater amounts through extensive reductions in the rates of interest and profits [and] in the discontent of labor and in an increasing antagonism of nations.” Sound familiar? One downside of this progress was chronic instability. There were financial panics or depressions in 1873, 1882, 1893 and 1907, among other years. Labor strife often disintegrated into violent protests when firms cut wages. Some economic dynamism spawned stock market speculation and fraud. In the post-World War II era, we thought we were modernizing and improving this raw capitalism. Active monetary and fiscal policy – the government’s use of credit and the federal budget – would smooth business cycles. The social safety net (unemployment insurance, food stamps and the like) would mitigate human suffering caused by unavoidable slumps. There was an historic break. The old and cruel capitalism was giving way to a new and gentler capitalism. Or was it? The further we get from World War II, the more that the new capitalism seems to resemble the old. Advances in productivity and living standards come in unpredicted spurts; severe business cycles endure; economic inequality increases. It is an exaggeration to say that the new capitalism has entirely reverted into the old. The social safety net and modern monetary and fiscal policy remain. Still, the past is slowly catching up with the future. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/samuelson-children-versus-grandparents/</link>
        <title>Samuelson: Children versus grandparents</title>
        <description>The struggle will intensify. We all know – or should – that the United States is an aging society (the 65-and over population was 12 percent of the total in 2000 and is projected to be 20 percent in 2040)....</description>
        <pubDate>Tue, 10 Apr 2018 05:03:28 -0600</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">696E3650-B31B-5313-E053-0100007F0848</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=BDCE046D-D591-4B14-81C5-115DF0610295&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=BDCE046D-D591-4B14-81C5-115DF0610295&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[WASHINGTON – To those paying attention, the recent strikes for higher teachers’ pay in West Virginia and Oklahoma are a harbinger of things to come. You can attribute the strikes to the stinginess of the states’ political leaders. After all, average annual teachers’ salaries in these states ranked respectively 49th lowest (Oklahoma at $45,276) and 48th lowest (West Virginia, $45,622) in 2016, reports the National Education Association. But that’s the superficial explanation. The deeper cause is that teachers – and schools – are competing with the elderly for scarce funds. The struggle will intensify. We all know – or should – that the United States is an aging society (the 65-and over population was 12 percent of the total in 2000 and is projected to be 20 percent in 2040). It’s also common knowledge that spending on the elderly, mainly Social Security and Medicare, has squeezed other federal programs, inflated budget deficits and created pressures for higher taxes. What’s less well known is that similar forces now assail states and localities. Spending on the elderly is squeezing K-12 schools, police, parks, libraries, roads and other infrastructure (water projects, sewers), mainly through two programs: a) Medicaid, a joint state-federal program of health insurance for the poor, which pays about half of nursing home and long-term care costs for the aged and disabled (on average, states pay about 37 percent of Medicaid’s costs); and b) contributions to underfunded pensions for state and local workers. Here’s how the Rockefeller Institute of Government, a nonprofit think tank, assessed the situation in a 2016 report: “In 37 states, pension contributions plus state-funded Medicaid grew by more than state and local government tax revenues between 2007 and 2014, in real per-capita terms. In response ... state and local governments have cut infrastructure investment, slashed support for higher education, cut social benefits other than Medicaid, cut spending on K-12 education ... and reduced most other areas of the budget.” No doubt some legitimate savings can be achieved; and conditions vary across states and localities. Still, state and local tax revenues are growing slowly, and virtually all the increase from 2008 to 2015 (88 percent, to be precise) was absorbed by higher pension contributions and Medicaid costs. Meanwhile, tuition at state colleges and universities rose from 29 percent of total educational revenue in 2000 to 47 percent in 2014; and per pupil K-12 spending, adjusted for inflation, fell 5 percent from 2008 to 2014. The squeeze will worsen. As baby-boomers age, more of them will end up in nursing homes. Similarly, the Affordable Care Act included an expansion of Medicaid benefits that, so far, 33 states have adopted, according to the Kaiser Family Foundation. The federal government initially covered all of the expansion’s cost, but this share is scheduled to fall to 90 percent in 2020. There will likely be proposals for states to pick up even more of the tab. Congressional Republicans have suggested converting the federal share to a block grant, which would probably raise states’ costs. What should be done? I have long advocated that Medicaid’s coverage of long-term care – the costliest part of the program – be moved into Medicare, which is fully paid by the federal government. This would break the automatic link between an aging population and the pressure on states and localities to cut non-health care spending. It would be easier for them to set their own priorities, rather than being bound by the trajectory of health spending. Under this proposal, the states and localities would take full responsibility for Medicaid’s coverage of children and poor adults, who represent about three quarters of beneficiaries but only one-third of costs. This would reinforce states’ and localities’ existing responsibilities to educate and protect children through K-12 schools and traditional welfare. To make the transfer of responsibilities budget neutral, some federal aid programs for states and localities – transportation and K-12 education pop to mind – could be ended. The truth is that we can no longer afford overlapping bureaucracies, which are often expensive and ineffective. Of course, this proposal stands virtually no chance of passage. Hard choices couldn’t be avoided. The underlying issue is genuinely difficult. It’s children vs. grandparents. A sensible society would direct its governmental programs and investments toward preparing for the future. Instead, our emphasis is backward-looking with more and more support going to the aged. On the other hand, a compassionate and caring society – a civilized society – doesn’t discard its older members just because their self-reliance and social utility have declined. Teachers and others will continue to battle the demographics. Until we muster the courage to be candid about the choices, we will be stuck in a place we don’t want to be. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
    <item>
        <link>https://www.durangoherald.com/articles/columnists/samuelson-why-fossil-fuels-survive/</link>
        <title>Samuelson: Why fossil fuels survive</title>
        <description>Robert Samuelsondu1-i-syn It’s true that the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris climate agreement, making any transition harder. But the problems transcend President Trump’s disengagement, as a new study from the oil giant BP makes clear (https://tinyurl.com/yc9ytyv4). Reading it,...</description>
        <pubDate>Mon, 05 Mar 2018 05:03:13 -0700</pubDate>
        <guid isPermaLink="false">667C3A26-719F-5C14-E053-0100007F4C63</guid>
        <media:content url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=034C9246-E547-4318-8CEA-090A62C45793&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" medium="image" type="image/jpeg" />
        <media:thumbnail url="https://imengine.public.prod.dur.navigacloud.com/?uuid=034C9246-E547-4318-8CEA-090A62C45793&#038;function=thumbnail&#038;type=preview&#038;source=false&#038;width=600&#038;height=400" />
        <content:encoded><![CDATA[Robert Samuelsondu1-i-syn WASHINGTON – Anyone who tells you that dealing with climate change is simply a matter of sweeping away the obstructionism of oil companies is living in a dream world. The real obstacle is us – our vast dependence on fossil fuels and the difficulty of extricating ourselves without crippling the world economy. It’s true that the Trump administration has withdrawn from the Paris climate agreement, making any transition harder. But the problems transcend President Trump’s disengagement, as a new study from the oil giant BP makes clear (https://tinyurl.com/yc9ytyv4). Reading it, you might think it came from an environmental group. The study’s central conclusion, writes BP chief executive Bob Dudley, is that many anti-global warming policies fall “well short of” what’s “necessary to achieve the Paris climate goals. We need a far more decisive break from the past.” The study projects global energy supply and demand to 2040 to see if environmentally friendly policies make significant progress against global warming. It assumes a larger role for “renewables” – mostly wind and solar power – and other policies that would dampen fossil fuel consumption. Consider: Electric cars make large advances compared with a negligible role today. By 2040, the number of electric vehicles worldwide hits 300 million out of 2 billion total vehicles (roughly a doubling of today’s total). More important, these electric vehicles account for a disproportionate share of driving, about 30 percent. As a result, there’s no increase in oil and liquid fuel demand for cars and light vehicles, despite an assumed doubling in worldwide travel.There’s a continued boom in solar and wind power. From now until 2040, these renewables are the fastest-growing source of energy, increasing five-fold. As a share of global primary fuel consumption, the gain is from 4 percent to 14 percent. Their impact on electricity generation is even greater, rising from 7 percent in 2016 to 25 percent in 2040.Electric utilities continue to switch to natural gas as their primary fuel from coal, which has much higher carbon emissions. About half the growth in natural gas consumption reflects this switching.Against this backdrop, you’d expect significant progress in curbing greenhouse gases. Not so. Just the opposite: Total use of fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal) is projected to increase almost 20 percent between 2016 and 2040. The electric cars, renewables and fuel switching merely offset some – but not all – of the added energy demand from population and economic growth. The BP study assumes a world population of 9.2 billion in 2040, up from 7.4 billion in 2016. Over the same period, the global economy doubles its output. What this means is that greenhouse gases are still pouring into the atmosphere, albeit at a slower rate. There’s a slight shift away from fossil fuels. In 2016, these fuels provided 85 percent of world energy. The projection for 2040 is 74 percent, even with favorable assumptions about renewables and electric vehicles. Virtually all the energy increase is projected to come from developing countries for factories, offices, homes, air conditioners and heaters. India and China alone account for half the increase in energy use by 2040. Governments, says Spencer Dale, BP’s chief economist, should discourage the use of fossil fuels through either a carbon tax or a “tax and trade” system. That could unleash hordes of companies and entrepreneurs to find ways to limit emissions. “If we don’t like something [greenhouse gases], the easiest way to get less of it is to put a price on it,” Dale says. Indeed, this could herald a “decisive break” from the past. But it might also break public opinion, at least in the United States. How high would prices have to go to prove Dale’s point? To succeed, the price increase might have to be fairly stiff – say, $2 or $3 a gallon for gasoline – and that might be far more than Congress would adopt or many Americans would accept. Suppressing greenhouse gases is, at best, a thorny policy issue encompassing technology, atmospheric science, international relations and practical politics. Put them all together and, at worst, it could be mission impossible. Robert Samuelson is a columnist for The Washington Post. © 2018 The Washington Post Writers Group]]></content:encoded>
    </item>
</channel>
</rss>
