The gas and oil industry in Colorado is active on many levels, the most obvious of which is in drilling for and recovering the vast pool of resources underlying much of Colorado’s surface land. Less observable is the industry’s work to ensure that accessing that gas is not unduly impeded by lawmakers’ doings. By and large it is not, but a recent report from Colorado Ethics Watch posits that is because the industry exerts undue influence on state legislators and the decisions they make.
While it is true that the industry spends large sums on candidate races and lobbying efforts in Colorado, claiming that such efforts amount to excessive influence on votes is bit of a leap. An alternate scenario, and one perhaps more in tune with reality in the state, is that Colorado does a good job regulating an important industry that, nevertheless, brings with it significant and not altogether positive impacts to the communities where it occurs. This balance has not been struck quickly or easily, but exists nevertheless, after years – decades even – of refining, improving and broadening the regulatory and oversight environment governing gas and oil development.
From its title on, the report – Spend Baby Spend: How Oil and Gas Controls Colorado – wastes little time in condemning the relationship between the industry and the politicians making decisions affecting development activity. “The oil and gas industry punches above its weight when it comes to influence on Colorado politics,” the report says, citing lobbying expenditures of $4.7 million between 2008-12, as well as $800,000 in political contributions during the 2010 and 2013 elections. The report connects that spending to legislative activity – particularly that in the 2013 session wherein measures that would forbid industry representatives from serving on the Colorado Oil & Gas Conservation Commission and increase fines on producers who break the rules both failed to pass. While it is conceivable that these bills died as a result of gas and oil industry spending, it is equally plausible that legislators killed them because they realized they were unnecessary in a state with a robust and involved regulatory body that comprises a broad array of expertise including industry, public health, environmental, wildlife and other critical interests that are affected by gas and oil development. The COGCC, while not perfect, is undeniably functional and industry representation – not ownership – is critical to that functionality.
The report did not mention that these same lawmakers passed a budget that included significant funding for drilling-related air quality studies ($2 million), leak detection ($500,000) and additional COGCC staff. That pragmatic funding suggests that regulating the oil and gas industry is a priority for legislators, despite spending from industry, but these lawmakers understand that investing in best practices and solving known problems is a better approach than passing divisive, reactionary and ultimately unnecessary legislation.
This is not to say that the gas and oil industry has no influence in Colorado policymaking. It almost certainly does, and the money it spends is at least part of the reason why. But suggesting that there is a direct, causative, quid pro quo relationship between the industry, its largesse, and lawmakers’ decisions is both overly simplistic and inaccurate.
